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RIGHTS WARNINGS IN THE
ARMED SERVICES*
Captain Fredric I. Lederer**
I. INTRODUCTION
The right against self-incrimination has been considered a fun-
damental principle of American law since at least the ratification
of the fifth amendment to the Constitution in 1791.1 Despite this, it
took some 175 years before this right was meaningfully im-
plemented by requiring that persons suspected of crime be warned
of their right to remain silent before a custodial police interrogation
could take place.2 While the warning requirement burst upon the
civilian population in 1966 with the Supreme Court's decision in
the case of Miranda v. Arizona,3 a similar and in one sensebroader
warning requirement had been in effect in the Army since 19484
and in the armed services generally since 1951.5 Indeed, the
military requirement was noted with approval in the Supreme
Court's opinion in Miranda.6 As we near the 10th anniversary of
*This article is adapted from a paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the re-
quirements for the LL.M. degree at the University of Virginia School of Law. The
opinions and conclusions presented in this article are those of the author and do not
necessarily represent the views of The Judge Advocate General's School or any
other governmental agency.
-*JAGC, U.S. Army. Instructor, Criminal Law Division. The Judge Advocate
General's School, U.S. Army; Lecturer in Law, University of Virginia. B.S.. 196S,
Polytechnic Institute of New York; J.D., 1971, Columbia University; LL.M., 1976,
University of Virginia. Member of the Bars of New York, the U.S. Court of Military
Appeals and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
For a comprehensive and perhaps definitive analysis of the right against self-
incrimination in England and pre-Constitutional America see L. LEVY, OaR;S"
THE FIFrH AMENDMENT (1968).
' Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda also required that an individual
in custody be told that he is entitled to the presence of an attorney, and that an at-
torney will be appointed if he cannot afford one; and that any statement he makes
may be used against him in a court of law.
,Id.
4Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, § 214, 41 Stat. 792.
Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 31, 10 U S.C. § 831 (1970)1 hereinafter cited as
Article 31]. Article 31 has remained unchanged since its original enactment in
Public Law 506 by the Second Session of the Eighty-first Congress on May 5, 1950.
384 U.S. at 489.
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Miranda and perhaps its impending destruction by the Supreme
Court, 7 it seems particularly appropriateto review the nature of the
statutorily based warning requirements now in use in the military.
Properly used, the term "right against self-incrimination," refers
specifically to the right of an individual to refuse to make an in-
criminating statement. Strictly speaking, the right does not in-
volve the voluntariness of a statement made when the right is not
invoked-an issue that is determined by the law of confessions.
Despite this differentiation, the two distinct legal doctrines have
tended to merge in the United States if only because the Miranda
warning requirement both implementsthe basic right by inform-
ing a suspect of its existence and at least in theory tends to make a
statement voluntary by interrupting thepossibly coercive nature of
a custodial interrogation. Accordingly, a proper understanding of
the warning requirements in the military requires a brief historical
review of both the right against self-incrimination and the volun-
tariness doctrine in the armed services.
II. HISTORY OF THE MILITARY RIGHT
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
Although it is difficult to find the specific origins of the military
right against self-incrimination in the United States, 8 it is clear
that aspects of the right existed by 1862 atthe latest.9 Until 1878 the
military accused was considered an incompetent witness and unfit
to take the witness stand in his own behalf' thus rendering the
issue academic insofar as formal judicial interrogation of the ac-
cused was concerned. When Congress removed the disability by
statute, however, it took care to make it clear that the accused did
not have to take the stand and that comment as to his failure to do
See, e.g., Michigan v. Mosley, 42d U.S. 96 (1975); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714
(1975); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
8 The right against self-incrimination was adopted by the British Army prior to
1806. A. TYTLER, AN ESSAY ON MILITARY LAW ANDTHE PRACTICE OF COURTS MARTIAL
283 (2d ed. 1806). For the American practice, seeWiener, Courts-Martialand the Bill
of Rights: The Original Practice I, 72 HARV. L. REv. 266, 277-78, nn.392-396 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as Wiener].
9 For an exposition of this right see S. BENET, A TREATISE ON MILITARY LAW ANDTHiE
PRACTICE OF COURTS-MARTIAL 310-13 (4th ed. 1864). The voluntariness doctrine, the
heart of the law of confessions, was evidently accepted by at least some American
military units near the turn of the nineteenth century. See MALTBY, A TREATISE ON
COURTS MARTIAL AND MILITARY LAW 43 (1813). This should not be surprising in view
of the general dependence of American military law on British practice. Wiener
states that the right against self-incrimination was recognized in at least one case in
1795, as well as in Article 6 of the 1786 Articles of War. Wiener, supra note 8, at 277.
10 This rule was changed by statute. Act of March 16, 1878, ch. 37, 20 Stat. 30. See
generally W. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 335-36 (2d ed. 1920 reprint)
[hereinafter cited as WINTHROP].
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so could not be made.1' The application of the right to witnesses at
courts-martial remains unclear until 1916 although there is reason
to believe that the fifth amendment right was considered binding. 2
Statutory enactment of the right against self-incrimination
appears to stem directly from the Army's attempt to enforce its
right to compel attendance of civilian witnesses at trials by court-
martial by certifying the witness' refusal to appear or testify to a
federal district court for trial of the issue. When Congress enacted
the certification provision in 1901, it included the proviso "that no
witness shall be compelled to incriminate himself or to answer any
question which may tend to incriminate or degrade him."1 3 When
in 1912 Major General Enoch Crowder, then Judge Advocate
General of the Army, presented the first major revision in the Ar-
ticles of War in over one hundred years, his code lacked any
reference to a general right against self-incrimination. 4 However,
by 1914 the congressional hearings on the proposed revision con-
tained a new proposed Article of War 25 which declared:
No witness before a military court, commission, court of inquiry, or board,
or before any officer, military or civil, designated to take a deposition to be
read in evidence before a military court, commission, court of inquiry, or
board, shall be compelled to incriminate himself or to answer any questions
which my tend to incriminate or degrade him.1
In his testimony before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs,
General Crowder explained that because the self-incrimination ex-
emption had originally been attached to the certification act,
... the construction was advanced that this language would not apply to
any other witnesses than those named in the act itself. It thus did not
protect any and all witness [sic] against self-incrimination but only those
described in the act in which the proviso appears. So I struck out that
proviso and have put it in the next article, where it will be of general
application.16
Congress accepted General Crowder's self-incrimination provision
11 According to the statute, the accused "shall, at his own request, but not otherwise,
be a competent witness. And his failure to make such request shall not create any
presumption against him." Act of March 16, 1878, ch. 37, 20 Stat. 30.
12 Winthrop apparently felt that the Supreme Court's fifth amendment decisions
were binding on courts-martial after the statute was adopted. Wls-riiiie, supra note
10, at 336 n.58. See also Wiener, supra note 8, at 277-78 nn.395, 396 which indicate
that warnings were given in an 1808 trial and recognized in part by 1795.
13 Act of March 2, 1901, ch. 809, § 1, 31 Stat. 951. See also Hearings on S. 3191 Before
the Subcomm. on Military Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Military Affairs, 6&1th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1916) as printed in S. REP. No. 130, 64th Cong., Ist Sess. 5211916)
[hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 130].
14 See generally Hearings on H.R. 23628 Before the House Comm. on Military Af.
fairs, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1912).
15 S. REP. No. 229, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, at art. 25 (1914).
16 S. REP. No. 130, supra note 13, at 53.
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and, renumbered, it became Article of War 24 when the revised Ar-
ticles of War were enacted in 1916. A minor revision was made in
1920 when the right against self-incrimination was expanded to in-
clude witnesses before officers conducting investigations.17 No
other statutory change took place, however, until the Elston Act of
1948.18 It should be noted that before the Elston Act revision, Arti-
cle of War 24 dealt only with judicial or quasi-judicial in-
terrogations. The statute was silent as to pretrial police in-
terrogations or their equivalent. The accused seems to have had the
right to remain silent and to refuse to cooperate in such an in-
vestigation. However, no formal warning of that fact was ap-
parently required although evidence exists that some form of warn-
ing was occasionally given by military investigators.19 The
primary check on pretrial interrogation was inserted into the
statute only in 1948; until then military due process and the com-
mon law requirement that confessions be voluntary and not the
product of improper coercion or inducement was the suspect's only
protection against abusive questioning.
World War II was fought under the Articles of War of 1916 as
revised in 1920. Soon after the close of the war it became evident
that substantial dissatisfaction existed with the Articles of War
and indeed with military justice in general. Complaints of
drumhead justice were frequent and a number of congressional
committees as well as the American Bar Association and other
legal groups began investigations of military justice during the
war.
2 0
As a consequence of this dissatisfaction Congress enacted a
number of significant changes to the Articles of War, one of which
involved the right against self-incrimination. 21 The various in-
vestigations into military justice during the Second World War had
emphasized displeasure with results caused by differentials in
rank. Particularly important in some cases was the potential for
commissioned or noncommissioned officers to compel subor-
dinates to incriminate themselves.22 In an effort to provide more
Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, art. 24, 41 Stat. 792.
' Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, § 214, 62 Stat. 631.
,9 Hearings on H.R. 2498 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Armed Ser
vices. 81st Cong., Ist Sess. 990-91 (1949) [hereinafter cited as 1949 Hearings). Mr.
Smart, a House Armed Services Committee Staffmember, related his experience of
being warned of his rights under Article of War 24. It is unclear whether this warn-
ing occurred before the Elston Act; however, it seems most likely that it took place
during the Second World War.
21 See T. GENEROUS, SWORDS AND SCALES 14-24 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
GENEROUS].
21 Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, § 214, 41 Stat. 792.
22 See generally REPORTOFTHE WAR DEPARTMENTADVISORY CoMmINIrrEE ON MILITARY
JUSTICE (1946) [hereinafter cited as VANDERBILT REPORT]. It is interesting to note
[Vol. 72
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fairness in interrogations, Congress amended Article of War 24 by
adding an entirely new second paragraph. In many respects the
amendment was unique in American law. It indicated: 0
The use of coercion or unlawful influence in any manner whatsoever by any
person to obtain any statement, admission or confession from any accused
person or witness, shall be deemed to be conduct to the prejudice of good
order and military discipline, and no such statement, admission or confes-
sion shall be received in evidence by any court-martial. It shall be the duty
of any person in obtaining any statement from an accused to advise him
that he does not have to make any statement at all regarding the offense of
which he is accused or being investigated, that any statement by the ac-
cused may be used as evidence against him in a trial by court-martial.'
It is difficult to overestimate the significance of this amendment. It
departed from previous law in three significant ways. First, it
adopted by statute the common law exclusionary rule already
found in the law of confessions. Second, it adopted a warning re-
quirement for the first time in federal statute, and third, it made the
use of coercion or unlawful influence to obtain a statement, admis-
sion or confession a criminal offense punishable by court-martial.
the expansion of Article of War 24 also made that Article explicitly
applicable for the first time to an accused person as well as a
witness. Congress did not, however, clearly indicate whether the
failure to warn an accused or witness of his rights pursuant to Arti-
that attached to the Vanderbilt Report in the papers of Professor Edmund Morgan.
the chairman of the UCMJ Committee which proposed the new Uniform Code of
Military Justice, is a press release which stated: "Amendment of theArticles of War
will be proposed expressly to forbid coercion in any form in the procurement of ad-
missions and confessions of accused persons and to provide punishments for such
coercion or attempts at coercion." War Department Public Relations Division, Press
Section at 6, Feb. 20, 1947, on file with the Edmund Morris Morgan Papers,
Manuscript Division, Harvard Law School Library [hereinafter cited as Morgan
Papers].
The punitive portions of the Elston Act's revision of Article of War 24 were intend-
ed to prevent, at the very least, outright physical coercion of confessions. The"third
degree" was considered a problem. See Hearings on H.R. 2575 Before a Subcomm. of
the House Comm. on Armed Services, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2043 (1947). In United
States v. Gibson, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 746. 14 C.M.R. 164. 170 (1954) the Court of Military
Appeals recognized that the effect of superior rank or official position could make
the mere asking o'a question the equivalent of a command which might be regarded
as depriving an individual of his freedom to remain silent.
21 Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, § 214, art. 24,41 Stat. 792. The warning requirement
was added by amendment. Representative Burleson stated:
... I feel that when anyone authorized to take statements from an accused interogntes hun for that
purpose that he should tell the accused that any statement he makes may be used against him on the
trial of the offense with which he is charged.
94 CONG. REC. 184 (1948). Mr. Burleson was apparently motivated, at least in part.
by the mistaken belief that warnings were required in "most Statejurisdictions." Id.
However, there is no doubt that he was attempting to achieve greater fairness in in-
terrogations. From the textof his remarks in the Congressional Record, one can fair-
ly presume that he was concerned with the problems peculiar to military rank.
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cle of War 24 would be punishable by court-martial in the same
fashion that coercion or unlawful influence would be. Whether or
not failure to warn constituted coercion or unlawful influence was
also left open by the statute.
The Elston Act was the immediate result of the post-war attempt
to reform Army justice. Its existence, as such, was shortlived,
because the decision to unify the services under the Department of
Defense carried with it the task of preparing a uniform code of
military law.24 At the time that Professor Morgan of Harvard was
appointed to devise such a code for the armed services, defendants
and witnesses in Army courts-martial could invoke the statutory
right against self-incrimination which had been enacted into law
by the Elston Committee's efforts. The Articles for the Government
of the United States Navy, however, had no provision equivalent to
Article of War 24. According to the Comparative Studies Notebookl5
a document prepared to aid the codification effort, the only Naval
provision dealing with the right against self-incrimination was
found not in statute but rather in the Naval Courts and Boards of
1937, the equivalent of the Army's Manual for Courts-Martial. Sec-
tion 235 of the 1937 Naval Courts and Boards contained the follow-
ing provision:
The Constitution provides that no person shall be compelled to give any
evidence against himself. The prohibition of the fifth amendment against
compelling a man to give evidence against himself is a prohibition of the
use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him
and not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it is material.2,
The committee which prepared the Comparative Studies Notebook
rejected the proposed Navy bill that failed to refer specifically to a
right against self-incrimination, 27 preferring to adopt the Army
rule that preserved the right against self-incrimination in statutory
form. Significantly, the committee stated:
The practice of including in state codes relevant Constitutional provisions
in the form of statutes might well be followed in a code for the Government
of the Armed Forces. In operations overseas, in time of war, paucity of
reference material on courts-martial usually prevails. The code should
speak out clearly in every respect, including within its provisions basic con-
stitutional guarantees and limitations. Many who are called up to ad-
minister such law are unlearned in the law. Unless constitutional
provisions are reflected within the code the natural tendency is not to ven-
ture beyond the exact language of the code. Reversals by courts and
criticisms from the war may be avoided by resort to such a device.-"
24 See generally GENEROUS, supra note 20, at 34-53.
2' Id. at 37-38.
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Ultimately both the Code Committee and the Congress accepted
the recommendations of the Comparative Studies Committee.29
The final result was Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, which has remained unaltered from its enactment to
date.30
Although Professor Morgan's notes at Harvard Law School 1 in-
dicate that the actual language of Article 31 was scrutinized rather
closely, there is little evidence that all of the language of Article
31(a) and 31(b) was picked with specific ends in mind.3 2 Thus,
although the Court of Military Appeals has decided that the
coverage of the military right against self-incrimination is a good
deal broader than that of the fifth amendment right,33 relying in
part on the differences in language between the two phrasings,
there is little indication that Article 31 was intended to differ in its
'9 See note 5 supra.
' Article 31 reads:
(a) No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to incriminate himselfor to answer any
questions the answer to which may tend to incriminate him
(b) No person subject to this chapter may interrogate, or request any statement from. an accused era
person suspected of an offense without first informing hun of the nature of the accusation and ad.
vising him that hedoes not have to make any statement regarding the offense ofwhich he ts accused
or suspected and that any statement made by hun may be used as evidence against hun in a trial by
court-martial.
(c) No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to make a statement or produce evidence
before any military tribunal if the statement or evidence is not material to the issue and may tend to
degrade him.
(d) No statement obtained from any person in violation of this Artzcle.or through theuseof tocrcton,
unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement may be received in evidence against hun in a trial by
court-martial.
Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 31, 10 U.S.C. § 831 (1970). Compare id. with
Act of May 5, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-506, art. 31, 64 Stat. 118.
31 The kind assistance of Mrs. Chadbourne of the Harvard Law School Library dur-
ing my examination of Professor Morgan's papers is gratefully acknowledged.
32 Professor Morgan's papers indicate a number of handwritten changes in a text of
what ultimately became Article 31. As typed, with the handwritten changes shown
in brackets, the text reads (deletions are underlined):
No person subject to this code shall examine [interrogate] or obtain [request]any statement from.an
accused [or a person suspected of an offense (added)] without first informing hun of thenatureofthe
accusation and advising him that he does not have to make any statement at all regarding the
offense of which he is accused or being investigated and that any statement made by hun may be
used as evidence against him in a trial by court-martiaL (remainder not shown$
A subparagraph (e) was written in under the text as follows: "I would require
defense counsel to inform accused of this privilege." The text shown above was
designated Proposed Article 43, revised draft, December 6.1948. on file in Volume II
of the Morgan Papers, supra note 22. Of the three changes shown above, only one
appears truly critical-the addition of suspects to those entitled to rights warnings.
I See, e.g., United States v. Musguire. 9 U.S.C.M.A. 67. 2 C.M.R. 329 ( 195Xl in which
then Chief Judge Quinn stated:
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coverage from the fifth amendment. Indeed with the exception of
the Article 31(b) warning requirement, such evidence as may exist
seems to suggest the opposite conclusion. It is an interesting fact
that in the approximately ten pages of legislative hearings devoted
to consideration of Article 31,34 six pages discuss Article 31(c)35-
an aspect of the Code presently a dead letter.36 Virtually no discus-
sion was devoted to the substantive coverage of the basic right of
self-incrimination found in Article 31(a) and only a few paragraphs
on the scope of the rights warning requirements found in Article
31(b).37 Article 31, as ultimately enacted by Congress did not in-
clude language equivalent to that found in the Elston Act's revision
of Article of War 24 making the coercion of a confession a crime un-
der the Code. Both Professor Morgan's materials and the con-
gressional hearings make it abundantly clear that this language
was eliminated from Article 31 on the grounds that it was un-
necessary and superfluous in view of the creation of a new article of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 98.38 Indeed on March
Article 31 is wider in scope than the Fifth Amendment. As we pointed out recently in United States v
Aronson. 8 USCMA 525, 25 CMR 29, Article 31 is "intended to protect persons accused or suspected of
crime %.ho might otherwise be at a disadvantage because of the military rule of obedience to proper
.uthority."
Id. at 68, 25 C.M.R. at 330.
14 See 1949 Hearings, supra note 19, at 983-93. These hearings took place in March
1949.
15 See note 30 supra.
1 Article 31(c) appears useless, for if a matter is not material it is irrelevant and in-
admissible. It may be that the increased legalization of military justice has mooted
this issue. See, e.g., 1949 Hearings, supra note 19, at 985.
I- See id. at 990-92.
is On March 24, 1949, Mr. Felix Larkin, Assistant General Counsel of the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, testified:
[Article 31 I (b) incidentally, covers a wider scope in that you can't force a man to incriminate himself
beforehand-not just on the trial, if you will.And this in addition, since it prohibits any person trying to
force a person accused or one suspected, would make it a crime for any officer or any person who tries to
force a person to do that.
So not only do we retain the constitutional protections against self-incrimination and this evidentiary
protection against degrading yourself unless it is material, but it goes further and provides that if
anyone tries to force you to incriminate yourself then he has committed an offense..
1949 Hearings, supra note 19, at 988.
The revised draft of then proposed Article 43 in Professor Morgan's notes contains
a typewritten passage:
It is felt that [Article 31I makes it even clearer that any person who compels self-incrimination will be
subject to punishment under the proposed punitive article [now Article 981 which makes violation of
procedural articles an offense under the code.
Morgan Papers, supra note 22, notes for Dec. 6, 1948, at 8.
The final Article 31 Commentary indicated that Article 31(b) broadened Article of
War 24 to those who were suspected as well as accused and that intentional violation
of any of provision Article 31 constituted an offense under Article 98. Morgan
Papers, supra note 22, Volume II, UCMJ, Text, References and Commentary Based
[Vol. 72
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23, 1949 during the hearings on the Uniform Code of Military
Justice before the House Subcommittee considering Article 31, Mr.
Robert W. Smart, a staff member, testified that "the international
[sic] violation of any of the provisons of this article constitutes an
offense punishable under Article 98."39 This would appear to cor-
rect the vagueness left in Article of War 24 as to whether or not
failure to give the warnings might in itself be a criminal offense.
However, the failure to include within Article 31 express language
making failure to comply with its provisions an offense must be
presumed to be at least one of the explanations for the complete and
utter failure of the Article 98 sanction. No recorded case exists in
which a member of the military has been prosecuted under Article
9840 or any other article for coercion of a confession, let alone failure
to give the rights warnings.
III. ARTICLE 31
A. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF ARTICLE 31 AND
MIRANDA v. ARIZONA
Before proceeding to further analysis of the law relating to rights
warnings in the military, it is important to recognize the interac-
tion between Articles 31(a), 31(b) and the rights accorded by
Miranda v. Arizona. Although the statutory military right against
self-incrimination is found in Article 31(a), which speaks in terms
of incrimination, Article 31(b) appears to have a much broader
coverage. Whereas the question in 31(a) is the meaning of "in-
crimination," the question in 31(b) appears to be the definition of
the word "statement," for under Article 31(b), warnings, including
the right to remain silent, must be given before a "statement" may
be requested of a suspect. Indeed, the Court of Military Appeals has
indicated that the Article 31(b) language goes so far as to outlaw a
request without warnings for bodily fluid samples" or voice 2 or
on the Report of the Cmm on a Uniform Code of Military Justice to theSecretary of
Defense, at 47.
1949 Hearings. supra note 19, at ms.
Legend has it that a lieutenant colonel was once convicted of iolating Article 9s
for having negligently or intentionally thrown away some case files. Iftrue, the case
is unreported, presumably because the punishment was not sufficiently severe to
result in appellate judicial review. Commanders have preferred administrative
measures rather than criminal prosecutions to deal with the derelictions that Article
98 was intended to cover. Article 98 remains. however, a theoretically potent weapon
to control violations of constitutional rights.
11 See. e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 181. 48 C.M.R. 797 (1974); United
States v. Musguire, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 67,25 C.M.R. 329(1958); UnitedStates v.Jordan,7
U.S.C.MA. 452, 22 C.M.R. 242 (1947).
42 Cf. United States v. Minnifield, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 373, 26 C.M.R. 153 (1958).
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handwriting43 exemplars. Thus, Article 31(b) is in fact a substan-
tive right against self-incrimination in and of itself because it has
been interpreted to apply to nonverbal acts.
Even the most cursory view of Article 31 will immediately reveal
the lack of any right to counsel. 43aThe legislative history reveals no
reference whatsoever to a right to counsel within the military right
against self-incrimination. The right to counsel does, however, ap-
ply to military members just as it does to civilians. Subsequent to
Miranda, the Court of Military Appeals held in the case of United
States v. Tempia44 that Miranda applied to all custodial in-
terrogations within the military. Accordingly, while Article 31(b)
warnings must be given to any person who is a suspect or an ac-
cused, Miranda rights to counsel, as set forth in paragraph 140a(2)
of the Manual for Courts-Martial, must be complied with only if the
military member is the subject of a custodial interrogation. In
military practice then, one must first determine whether or not an
individual questioned was a suspect or an accused and if so must
then determine whether or not the individual was in custody. With
these considerations in mind it is now possible to turn to an
analysis of rights warnings in the military.
The very nature of the phrasing of Article 31(b) supplies a
framework for analysis. As suggested by Professor Maguire, 45 Arti-
cle 31(b)'s language can easily be placed against the questions it
poses:
Who must warn? No person subject to this
When is warning required? [code] may interrogate, or re-
Who must be warned?
What warning is required?
quest any statement from, an
accused or a person suspected
of an offense without first in-
forming him of the nature of
the accusation and advising
him that he does not have to
make any statement regard-
ing the offense of which he is
1 Id. See also United States v. Penn, 18 U.S.C.MA. 194,39 C.M.R. 194(1969); United
States v. White, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 211, 38 C.M.R. 9 (1967).
43' Despite this, the Court of Military Appeals has recently found that either Article
27 or Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice requires that military police
notify an accused's defense counsel prior to interrogation. United States v.
McOmber, 24 U.S.C.M.A. 207,51 C.M.R. 452 (1976). This highly confusing opinion
creates the possibility that the Court may have found a right to counsel in Article 31.
- 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C M.R. 249 (1967).
, Maguire, The Warning Requirement ofArticle 31(b): Who Must Do What To Whom
and When?, 2 MIL L. REV. 1 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Maguire].
[Vol. 72
MILITARY RIGHTS WARNINGS
accused or suspected and that
any statement made by him
may be used as evidence
against him in a trial by court-
martial. 46
While the plain meaning of the statute would appear to answer
these questions, 25 years of litigation and judicial interpretation
have made it clear that virtually nothing involving Article 31 has a
"plain meaning." For ease of analysis the maj or questions are best
considered in the following sequence: what warnings are required;
who must give warnings; who must be warned; and when must
warnings be given.
B. THE CONTENT OF THE WARNINGS
As indicated above, the specific content oftheArticle 31(b)warn-
ing is comparatively simple. However, judicial decisions have
refined the meaning of the terms used in the clause. Whilethe Code
requires that the individual be informed of the nature of the accusa-
tion against him, a requirement not found in Miranda, the Code
does not indicate the degree of specificity required to satisfy this
provision. It now appears settled that as long as the individual be-
ing questioned is informed of the general nature of the offense,
rather than the specific article of the Code violated or the specific
degree of the offense, the interrogator has complied with the 31(b)
requirement. 47 Unlike other aspects of Article 31(b), the Court of
Military Appeals has held that it may be unnecessary for military
police or other persons in authority to inform an accused of the
nature of the offense when evidence exists that he is fully aware of
the offense and where other important considerations justify the
police failure to advise the accused of the specific offense. Thus in
United States v. Nitschke48 the accused was involved in an
automobile accident in Germany that killed a pedestrian. The ac-
cused had been drinking and was asked by criminal investigators
to give a blood sample. The CID agent involved did not notify the
accused that he was suspected of a homicide because a local doctor
had advised against it in light of the accused's mental state after
the accident. Throughout the interview, the accused kept repeating,
however, that he must have killed someone. On appeal, the Court of
Military Appeals found that the agent had simply omitted confirm-
ing the fatality and that in view of all the circumstances the ac-
4 Id. at 4.
See, e.g.. Maguire, supra note 45, at 28-30.
4 12 U.S.C.M.A. 489, 31 C.M.R. 75 (1961).
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cused knew of the nature of the offense. While this case should not
be interpreted liberally, it appears to remain good authority.
Where an accused is suspected of more than one offense, military
police must warn of all offenses or risk total suppression of any
statement that the accused may make.49 When knowledge of a
specific offense exists, it is insufficient for the Government to in-
form a suspect that the agents involved are interested in the ac-
tivities of the accused over a general period of time. For example, in
United States v. Reynold5° the Court of Military Appeals held that
where agents of the Air Force's Office of Special Investigations
(OSI) informed the accused that they were interested in his ac-
tivities over a given period of time when he was in fact suspected of
both absence without leave and larceny of an officer's vehicle, the
Government was held not to have complied with the requirements
of Article 31(b) and the suspect's statement was held inadmissible.
While it would appear reasonably simple to adhere to the require-
ment of Article 31(b) and inform a suspect of his right to remain
silent, the case law reflects numerous attempts by military police to
avoid complete compliance. Two 1953 cases 51 reversed convictions
in which military police had informed the accused that while Arti-
cle 31 meant that they did not have to incriminate themselves it did
not mean that they had a right to remain silent. Perhaps these
cases can be explained simply by pointing to their date and the un-
familiarity with the new Article 31, but it is unfortunately true that
similar cases have appeared in more recent years. 52 In 1972 for in-
stance, investigators told an accused who was suspected of larceny
and murder that if he was not involved and withheld knowledge of
the offense, he would be an accessory after the fact and could
receive 300 years in jail. The Court of Military Appeals reversed the
conviction for failure to comply with Article 31(b).53 All in all,
however, this portion of the Article 31(b) warnings appears to be
subject to general compliance by military interrogators.
Relatively few cases involve the third portion of Article 31(b)-
that portion which advises the accused or suspect of the fact that
anything he says may be used against him in a trial by court-
martial.54 If the suspect being questioned is in custody he must be
49 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 20 U.S.C.MA. 320, 43 C.M.R. 160 (1971); Uni-
ted States v. Reynolds, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 403, 37 C.M.R. 23 (1966).
50 16 U.S.C.M.A. 403, 37 C.M.R. 23 (1966).
51 United States v. Williams, 2 U.S.C.M A. 430, 9 C.M.R. 60 (1953); United States v.
Murray, 11 C.M.R. 495 (ABR 1953).
52 See, e.g., United States v. Hundley, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 320, 45 C.M.R. 94 (1972).
53 United States v. Peebles, 21 U.S.C.MA. 466, 45 C.M.R. 240 (1972).
-4 Cf. United States v. Greene, 15 U.S.C.MA.. 300, 35 C.M.R. 272 (1965).
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warned not only of his Article 31(b) rights but also of those rights
conferred by Miranda.55 These rights include the right to remain
silent, a warning that anything said may be used against the ac-
cused at trial, and the right to have an attorney present at the in-
terrogation with the additional right that if the individual cannot
afford an attorney one will be appointed for him. The exact nature
of the right to counsel in the military merits detailed discussion and
will be so treated later in this article.
C. WHO MUST WARN?
Who must give Article 31(b) warnings is perhaps the single most
complex question raised by Article 31. In civilian jurisdictions
Miranda warnings must be given by persons with official status in-
vestigating possible criminal conduct. As a practical matter this
generally means police officers. To further simplify the situation,
Miranda warnings are required only during custodial in-
terrogations. On the other hand, Article 31(b) read literally, re-
quires warnings during any criminal interrogation of a suspect by
a person subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. If Article
31(b) were to be interpreted literally, warnings would be required
every time an accused or suspect is questioned. Although this
possibility does not necessarily appear unreasonable, it raises a
number of significant problems.
Many of these difficulties stem directly from the peculiar nature
of the military itself. All military personnel have rank and status
and virtually every military member is potentially senior to at least
one other and thus holds actual or potential disciplinary authority.
Even those individuals performing nonpolice duties frequently
hold disciplinary or quasi-police powers. Thus an Army doctor who
questions a patient may do so for medical purposes just as a civilian
doctor might. However, unlike his civilian colleague, the Army doc-
tor is a military officer with the same authority and powers that a
military police officer holds.56 Must Article 31 warnings by given
by a military doctor who in the course of performing a medical ex-
amination questions a patient known to be a criminal suspect? To
date the courts have absolved the medical corps and others from
such responsibilities as long as their questions are purely
professional or "personal" in nature. This has been the result of
55 United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629,37 C.M.R. 249 (1967).
56 While members of the Medical Corps are restricted in their command authority
and spared certain responsibilities because of the need for medical specialists, they
retain the full powers to question and apprehend that any otherofficermayhave.
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what has been called the "official capacity test" applied by the
Court of Military Appeals.57
Under the test, the court has insisted that trial courts determine
the role or status of an interrogator at the instant of interrogation.
Thus who must give warnings frequently becomes a question of
fact. Was the JAGC officer who questioned the suspect acting as an
attorney or as an officer holding police powers? As can be imag-
ined, the official capacity test has been extremely difficult to imple-
ment and has given rise to a great deal of appellate litigation.
The simplistic alternative to the official capacity test would be to
hold that Article 31(b)'s literal interpretation is binding. This
eminently workable solution has recently been proposed yet again
by Senior Judge Ferguson of the Court of Military Appeals in the
case of United States v. Seay,58 decided on November 7, 1975. Con-
curring in the result, Judge Ferguson stated:
I would apply the literal language of Article 31. No plainer nor clearer
language may be imagined than "[nlo person subject this chapter. .
This Court's mandate is to apply and, when necessary, to interpret the law,
not to ignore statutory language which lends itself to but one meaning.
Furthermore, the reason for this broad literal proscription imposed by Con-
gress is illustrated by the case atbar. In the military, unlike civilian society,
the exact relationship at any given moment between the ordinary soldier
and other service personnel in authority (i.e., commissioned and noncom-
missioned officers) often is unclear. In the civilian experience, it is unlikely
that anyone to whom Miranda might apply would question someone else
other than in the former's official capacity-that is, as a law enforcement
officer. . . . Thus, to simplify matters, and in recognition of the
superior/subordinate atmosphere inherent in the military not present in
the civilian structure, the [Article 31] requirement is broader [than Miran-
da's].
• . . [W]e have seen in repeated instances the difficulty the military seems to
have in applying a more narrow proscription such as the "official capacity"
standard... [Tihis case has served to illustrate the wisdom of the Con-
gress in removing from consideration such irrelevant factors as whether
the questioner did or did not ask questions in an official capacity. Thus
when any person subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice questions
a person suspected or accused of a violation of the Code without first ad-
vising him of his pertinent rights, he has thereby violated Article 31 and
any further inquiry is immaterial to the legal conclusion of inadmissibility
of the result of such interrogation.5 9
While a fuller understanding of Judge Ferguson's position and
its consequences must await an exposition of the numerous cases
within this area, adoption of the Judge's position would bar the use
57 The test may have its origins in United States v. Wilson, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 2,18, 8
C.M.R. 248 (1953). See Maguire, supra note 45, at 6-14.
.8 24 U.S.C.M.A. 7, 51 C.M.R. 57 (1975).
'9 Id. at 12-13, 51 C.M.R. at 62-63 (citations omitted).
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of any unwarned statements taken from a suspect or accused in a
criminal prosecution. The difficulties inherent in this proposition
may not be readily recognized. On one hand, such a rule would
further complicate the already difficult problem of psychiatric
evaluations of accused persons 60 and raise new questions about the
use of undercover agents;61 and on the other hand, because of the
exclusionary rule and a recent decision of the Court of Military
Appeals in the immunity area,62 it would likely compel the prosecu-
tion to prove that unwarned statements were not used in any
fashion in preparation for the ultimate prosecution in substantial-
ly more cases than at present. The practical burden that this
development might place on the prosecution might well be insur-
mountable63 depending upon the number of unwarned statements
that actually occur. Since there are only a limited number of areas
in which the courts have applied the official capacity test, this con-
cern may well be a needless one, however.
1. "Private Citizens"
A question of theoretical importance that has rarely arisen in ac-
tual practice is the responsibility of an individual to give rights
warnings when he does not in fact hold any form of disciplinary
authority. In the usual case, one private informally questions
another suspected of barracks theft. In the civilian world a private
citizen certainly has no responsibility to give warnings to another
citizen. What, however, of Article 31(b)'s intonation that "no per-
son" may interrogate another without giving warnings? In the
only two cases on point, the military courts have applied the official
capacity test: where a military member is acting in a purely per-
sonal capacity and lacks disciplinary authority, warnings are not
required. Thus in United States v. Bartee,64 two Marines returned
60 See Section III.C.3. infra.
"' There is a serious academic argument about whether Article 31(b) requires even
undercover operatives to give warnings while in their undercover roles. See text ac-
companying notes 106-126 infra.
62 United States v. Rivera, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 430, 50 C.M.R. 389 (1975).
61 The court's holding in Rivera is certainly noncontroversial. It requires the prosec-
tion to prove, rather than just represent, that no use has been made of immunized
testimony when prosecuting an accused who testified at a prior trial pursuant to a
grant of use or testimonial immunity. However, the opinion contains dicta to the
effect that such prosecutions of immunized individuals are to be extremely dis-
couraged. Id. at 433,50 C.M.R. at 392. Rivera would suggest that the existence of an
unwarned statement might be taken by the Court of Military Appeals to have un-
lawfully narrQwed the case or supplied a witness or other evidence. This use of the
exclusionary rule is somewhat extreme compared to the general civilian rule.
f 50 C.M.R. 51 (NCMR 1974). See also United States v. Schilling. 7 U.S.C.M.A. 482.
484, 22 C.M.R. 272, 274 (1957) apparently in partial contradiction to Bartee.
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to their squad bay to discover that a tape player and five tapes were
missing. The next morning one of the Marines heard one of the
stolen tapes being played elsewhere in the squad bay. The Marine
called a corporal, walked over to the locker the sound was coming
from and told the corporal that his tape was playing within the wall
locker. The accused was standing by the locker at the time and the
victim informed him that he had his tape in the locker. The accused
replied by taking the tape player and tapes from the wall locker and
throwing them on a bed. The Navy Court of Military Review,
quoting the earlier case of United States v. Woods65 for the principle
that where failure to warn is at issue "the ultimate inquiry is
whether the individual, in line of duty, is acting on behalf of the
service or is motivated solely by personalconsiderations when he
seeks to question one whom he suspects of an offense," 66 found that
the Marine victim's initial statement to Bartee was motivated sole-
ly by personal considerations and would not have required Article
31(b) warnings. However, the court accepted as binding the
testimony of the corporal who added to the victim's statement by
saying that he had asked Bartee where the rest of the tapes were
and that it was his question that led to Bartee's surrender of the
tapes. The court found that the corporal's official position required
him to give Article 31 warnings prior to his remark to Bartee and
thus reversed Bartee's conviction of that particular specification as
having resulted from a violation of Article 31.
In the unique6 7 case of United States v. Trojanowski,6 8 the ac-
cused admitted a barracks theft after having been beaten by the
victim. On appeal, the Court of Military Appeals held that
although the beating of the accused had violated Article 31(a), the
theft victim had been acting in a personal capacity and had not
been required to give rights warnings prior to questioning the ac-
cused.69
There appears to be one major caveat to the official-personal
capacity test. In 1959 the Court of Military Appeals indicated in
65 22 U.S.C.M.A. 369, 47 C.M.R. 124 (1973).
6650 C.M.R. at 58-59, citing 22 U.S.C.M.A. 369,371,47 C.M.R. 124,126(1973), in turn
citing United States v. Beck, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 333, 338, 35 C.M.R. 305, 310 (1965).
67 Believed to be the only case to include a violation of both Article 3 1(a) and Article
31(b) in the personal questioning area.
68 5 U.S.C.M.A. 305, 17 C.M.R. 305 (1954).
69 Surprisingly, the court affirmed Trojanowski's conviction, reasoning that his ad-
missions had been nonprejudicial. Inasmuch as the usual rule is the "automatic
reversal" rule which refuses to test erroneous admission of confession evidence for
prejudice, see, e.g.. United States v. Wagner, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 216,39 C.M.R. 216 (1969),
this aspect of the case must be considered an aberration based perhaps on the court's
conclusion that a defendant who is so clearly guilty should not go free, traditionally
known as the "bad man" rule.
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United States v. Souderv° that despite an interrogator's lack of of-
ficial capacity, warnings would be required if the questioner's in-
tention was to perfect a case against the accused. This case was
thought to have potentially awesome consequences,71 but the
Souder dictum has apparently died stillborn.72
2. The Interrogating Guard
The official capacity test was applied consistently by the Court of
Military Appeals until November of 1975.73 While the test was easy
to apply in theory, it was particularly difficult to apply in practice
calling as it did for a factual determination of an interrogator's in-
tent.74 Indeed, the application of the test has proved particularly
difficult in at least one important area-that of the interrogating
guard. When military police themselves become criminal suspects
and are placed in confinement, they are usually guarded by
members of the military police who are former associates and often
friends. A number of cases in the Court-Martial Reports deal with
admissions made by such an individual to his guard.75 In such
cases the military appellate courts have applied the official capaci-
ty test by determining the motivation of the guard at the time that
he questioned the suspect. The trial court would thus be forced to
determine whether the guard was acting as a personal friend and
expressing merely a polite personal interest or was, on the other
hand, acting as a policeman interrogating a suspect. As can be an-
ticipated, this determination has been exceedingly difficult for the
trial courts. Considering the appellate results, one might also
observe that the testhas worked almost entirely to the benefit of the
Government. 6 It was this peculiar result of admitting into
70 11 U.S.C.M.A. 59, 28 C.M.R. 283 (1959).
71 Particularly in the undercover agent area. See Comment. Interrogation of
Suspects By "Secret" Investigation, 12 MIL L. REv 269 (1961).
72 Souder does not appear to have been cited as binding precedent in any case.
73 See United States v. Dohle, 24 U.S.C.M-A. 34, 51 C.M.R. 84 (1975).
74 See, e.g., United States v. Dandaneau, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 462. 18 C.M.R. 86 (1958) in
which the court sustained the admissibility of incriminating admissions made by
Sergeant Dandaneau to a captain who had engaged him in a casual "p-csonal" con-
versation regarding his reasons for missing movement. The "personal" conversa-
was followed one hour later by an official inquiry by the captain prefaced by Article
31(b) warnings but consisting primarily of the same questions the accused had
answered an hour before. The court's determination of the nature of the first conver-
sation was, of course, a factual one. If correct when decided, Dandancau is suspect
today.
75 See, e.g., United States v. Carlisle, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 564,48 C.M.R. 71 (1974); United
States v. Beck, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 333, 35 C.M.R. 305 (1965).
,1, While the Court in the Beck case remanded to allow a possible rehearing as to the
status of Beck's guard during the interrogation, 15 U.S.C.M.A. at 339,35 C.M.R. at
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evidence the results of such custodial questioning by individuals
who by happenstance were personal acquaintances of the suspect
that led to the case of United States v. Dohle.77
In Dohle, the accused was suspected of the theft of four M-16 rifles
and 14 locks. Chief Judge Fletcher rejected the official capacity
test, and, attempting to overrule prior decisions, announced a new
test that might be called the position of authority test. He stated:
Where the questioner is in a position of authority, we do not believe that an
inquiry into his motives ensures that the protections granted an accused or
suspect by Article 31 are observed. While the phrase "interrogate, or request
any statement from" in Article 31 may imply some degree of officiality in
the questioning before Article 31 becomes operative .... the phrase does
not also imply that non-personal motives are necessary before the Article
becomes applicable. Indeed, in the military setting in which we operate,
which depends for its very existence upon superior-subordinate
relationships, we must recognize that the position of the questioner,
regardless of his motives, may be the moving factor in an accused's or
suspect's decision to speak. It is the accused's or suspect's state of mind,
then, not the questioner's, that is important.78
The effect of the Dohle case is unclear. While Judge Fletcher
spoke in the plural and announced a new test on behalf of the court,
it is clear that his new test was not joined in by his two judicial
brethren. Judge Ferguson concurred on the basis that he believed,
as in the Seay case, that Article 31 should be taken literally. Indeed,
Judge Ferguson stated specifically in Dohle that he refused to join
in the new test "the Chief Judge purports to enunciate in his
opinion. ' 79 Judge Cook concurred in the result on the basis of a
prior decision.80 Until Judge Ferguson's second retirement from
the bench 8' the impact of the Dohle case was, as a pragmatic
matter, easily ascertainable. A specific rule requiring anyone in a
position of authority to preface his questions with Article 31(b)
warnings had been announced and would certainly affect at least
the guard cases.
311, Carlisle and other cases have simply found the guard to have been acting in a
personal capacity despite what seems to have been official intent insofar as the
reported facts are revealed by the appellate cases.
77 24 U.S.C.M.A. 34, 51 C.M.R. 84 (1975).
78 Id. at 36-37, 51 C.M.R. at 86-87.
79 Id. at 37, 51 C.M.R. at 87.
80 Id. at 37, 51 C.M.R. at 87, citing United States v. Beck, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 333,339,35
C.M.R. 305, 311 (1965).
S Judge Homer Ferguson became a Senior Judge on May 2, 1971. On February 17,
1974, at the request of then Chief Judge Duncan, Judge Ferguson returned to full ac-
tive service presumably because of Judge Darden's resignation on December 29,
1973. Judge Ferguson continued to sit as a result of Chief Judge Duncan's resigna-
tion on July 11, 1974 and then Judge Quinn's retirement on April 25, 1975. See 49
C.M.R. at vii. It has only been with the 1975 appointment ofJudge Perry to the Court
that Judge Ferguson has been able to retire from active status. As of January 1976,
the Court's members were: Chief Judge Fletcher (confirmed April 4, 1975); Judge
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With Judge Ferguson's retirement, however, this aspect of Dohle
is clearly in question and it is unclear whether Dohle possesses any
precedential value beyond its peculiar facts.8 2 Judge Fletcher's
language in the case does not appear to do away with the official
capacity test. Rather it seems to add an additonal level:8 if an in-
terrogator is not in an active position of authority the court must
then turn to the official capacity test. For example, prior to Dohle,
the official capacity test was used to hold that individuals serving
as Charge of Quarters 4 and as Marine fire watches85 were required
to give Article 31(b) warnings if they intended to question in-
dividual suspects about criminal wrongdoing. It seems unlikely
that the position of authority test would in any way make a
difference in these cases. Although a Charge of Quarters may in-
deed be said to have authority because he in one sense acts in the
place of a company or squadron commander, a Marine fire watch
whose sole duty in effect is to be alert for fires or other disturbances
would seem to lack any authority in the usual sense. On the other
hand, it is certainly true that he is acting in an official capacity. Ac-
cordingly, it would seem likely that the official capacity test would
be applied.
It seems reasonable, therefore, to believe that the official
capacity-personal capacity dichotomy is still alive and well with
only a new twist added. However, it is possible that Dohle will be ex-
panded greatly in future months and years. Should this be the case,
it is likely that a number of different decisions will be called into
question, particularly those dealing vith undercover operatives.
These cases will be discussed in a later section of this article.
Cook (confirmed August 21,1974); Judge Perry. It should be clear that the makeup of
the Court of Military Appeals has changed drastically in a few short years. Accord-
ingly, many legal precedents are now open to question. The next two years should in-
dicate the new court's view of both military law generally and stare decisis par-
ticularly.
12 No one can anticipate the decision of Judge Ferguson's replacement on this issue.
However, Judge Perry's record as a civil libertarian does suggest that his decision in
such a case might well be similar to Chief Judge Fletcher's opinion in Dohe.
8 It has been suggested that Dohle can be viewed as attempting to promulgate a new
test that subsumes the "official capacity test." This may be an easier formulation to
work with. On the other hand, Dohle could be viewed as simply holding that those in
authority act in an official capacity.
81 United States v. Woods, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 369.47 C.M.R. 124 (1973). A CQ is an in-
dividual who has limited responsibility for a company during off-duty hours. His
primary responsibilities are administrative, including the notification of superior
officers in the event of a situation requiring a decision. CQ's are usually middle
grade NCO's.
85 United States v. Brazzil, NCM 740066 (NCMR 26 Apr. 1974) (unpublished opin-
ion). A Marine fire watch appears to be a low-ranking enlisted man whose primary
duty is to be alert for fire or other disturbance during evening off-duty hours.
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3. The Medical Profession
The most significant problem in the area of who must give warn-
nings involves the medical profession, and significantly different
considerations are raised by the differing roles of psychiatrists and
nonpsychiatrists. The problem is relatively simple when dealing
with nonpsychiatrist members of the medical profession. Depend-
ing upon the Dohle case,86 the question is the "traditional" one of
the intent of the doctor who questions the suspect. If his intent is a
medical one and he is questioning for diagnostic purposes, the
cases indicate that there is no requirement that the doctor must
give rights warnings. For example, in United States v. Fisher,'7
when the accused was brought into an emergency room with
respiratory depression, it was proper for the doctor to question him
without warnings as to the cause of the depression.88 The accused's
admissions as to the use of cocaine were held admissible at his sub-
sequent trial. However, as all members of the Medical Corps are of-
ficers with the same responsibilities and powers held by any other
military officer, if Dohle is to have any meaning beyond its narrow
facts, then perhaps "in authority" means that a questioner, in-
cluding a doctor, who outranks the individual being interrogated
must give warnings when that individual is a criminal suspect
regardless of any other motivation he might have for asking the
question.
If so, such a formulation would present difficulties when dealing
with the medical profession. While the military doctor does have
law enforcement powers, his primary duty is to maintain health
and to heal the sick. Requiring rights warnings of military doctors
when their sole intentis to perform their medical duty would clearly
chill the replies given by some patients and could makehealth care
for suspects difficult if not impossible. One could well urge that for
public policy reasons members of the medical profession should be
exempted from the responsibility of giving warnings when they act
in a medical capacity.
The major problem in this area deals, however, not with members
86 Since members of the Medical Corps are commissioned officers, the Court of
Military Appeals could easily find that they are in a "position of authority" when
questioning a known suspect regardless of their intent in questioning.
'7 21 U.S.C.M.A. 223, 44 C.M.R. 277 (1972).
88 See also United States v. Baker, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 313,29 C.M.R. 129 (1960) in which
the court sustained the admissibility of incriminating remarks made by Baker to a
Navy doctor who questioned him regarding "tracks" on his arm when the doctor ap-
parently suspected him of illegal narcotics use. The court justified its decision by
relying on the fact that the admissions were made at a second meeting after Baker
had requested help for an insomnia problem.
89 Of course, individuals other than those in the medical profession may also be con-
fronted with this problem. For a unique case involving testimony by a military
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of the medical profession generally8 9 but with psychiatrists in par-
ticular. The tension between the right against self-incrimination
and the presentation of psychiatric evidence by the defense at trial
is substantial, particularly in the military which lacks a doctor-
patient privilege.90 Having been given notice of a psychiatric
defense, the prosecution will usually desire to have the accused sub-
mit to an examination by a government psychiatrist L9 1 To allow the
accused to refuse to cooperate would seem to create an unsupport-
able and unfair burden for the prosecution while forcing coopera-
tion would seem to nullify the right against self-incrimination. In
the civilian courts, this problem has yet to be adequately dealt
with 92 although statutory privilege93 occasionally resolves the
matter when dealing with a question of competency to stand trial
rather than competency at the time of the offense. A limited waiver
of the right against self-incrimination has been found in a number
of the civilian jurisdictions9 4 and a substantial amount of critical
comment has been engendered. 95
In the military this situation has given rise to what is known as
the Babbidge Rule. In Babbidge,96 the Court of Military Appeals
held that when the accused raises a defense of insanity, he can be
compelled to undergo a limited government psychiatric evaluation.
The court found that a defense of insanity constituted an implied
lawyer of information gained from an interview of a co-accused (not his client), see
United States v. Marshall, 45 C.M.R. 802 (NCMR 1972).
9t MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATeS-. 1969 (Rev. ed.), para. 151c(2)
[hereinafter cited as MCM, 1969].
91 While the usual procedure in a civilian jurisdiction would be for the accused to be
examined by his own expert who would usually be an entirely different individual
than the expert used by the prosecution, the military practiceis frequently different.
The normal military situation in which the accused lacks funds to hire a civilian
psychiatrist would be for the accused to be examined by a military psychiatrist in
the first place. Examination by another psychiatrist will often not be possible for
the Government. Thus self-incrimination problems plague the defense from the very
start as the military psychiatrist is by no means a "defense" psychiatrist. Ofcourse
proper procedure will likely require an accused who is raising a defense of insanity
to submit to a miltiary sanity board. See generally MCM, 1969. para. 121.
92 For civilian cases discussing the issue see, eg., United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d
1936 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. McCracken, 488 F.2d 406(5th Cir. 1974): United
States v. Barrera, 486 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940 (1974): United
States v. Julian, 469 F.2d 371 (10th Cir. 1972); United States ex rel. Smith v. Yeager,
451 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719(4thCir. 1968).
93 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1970).
94 See United States v. McCracken, 488 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Barrera, 486 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940(1974); United States v.
Julian, 469 F.2d 371 (10th Cir. 1972): F. R. CRIM. P. 12.2.
95 See, e.g., Danforth, Death Knell for Pre-Trial Mental Examination?, 19 Rtr. L.
REv. 489 (1965); Note, Requiring a Criminal Defendant to Submit to a Government
Psychiatric Examination: An Invasion of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
83 HARV. L. REV. 648 (1970).
96 United States v. Babbidge, 18 U.S.C.MA . 327, 40 C.M.R. 39 (1969).
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waiver of the accused's rights against self-incrimination.97
Babbidge represents a compromise between the government's need
for proof and the accused's rights against self-incrimination.
Although the accused can be compelled to submit to a government
psychiatric evaluation on pain of having any defense expert
testimony suppressed at trial,98 the government psychiatrist in
theory may testify at trial only to his ultimate conclusions as to the
accused's sanity, either at trial or at the time of the offense. He may
not testify to any specific details given during the psychiatric inter-
views.9 9
The numerous problems of administration 00  and trial
procedure' 01 instigated by Babbidge arise only when a psychiatrist
971d. at 332,40 C.M.R. at 44 See generally Holladay, Pretrial MentalExaminations
Under Military Law: A Re-Examination, 16 A.F.L. REV. 14 (1974).
98 Babbidge suggested that an accused who refused to submit to a government
evaluation could be estopped from presenting a defense. If such is the case, this sanc-
tion is similar to that imposed on the person who refuses to testify upon cross-
examination. There the result of such a refusal may result in the striking of direct
testimony. United States v. Colon-Atienza, 22 U.S.C.M.. 399,47 C.M.R. 336 (1973).
However, Babbidge did not make it clear whether it was the entire defense of insani-
ty that could be estopped (or struck) or if it was only the expert psychiatric testimony
that was involved.
99 Cf. United States v. Johnson, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 424,47 C.M.R. 402,407-08 (1973): Uni-
ted States v. Babbidge, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 327, 332-33, 40 C.M.R. 39, 44-45 (1969).
10 Primary among the difficult questions spawned by Babbidge are the procedural
details that surround the so-called "trigger problem." These questions include
whether the Government may compel an accused to submit to a psychiatric ex-
amination if the defense chooses to raise the defense of insanity through lay rather
than expert psychiatric testimony, see MCM, 1969, para. 122c, which unlike some
civilian jurisdictions does not require expert evidence to either raise or rebut a
defense of insanity; at what point in the pretrial or trial proceedings the Govern-
ment may require such an examination; and whether the failure of an accused to
submit to such an examination would be grounds for precluding the use of such a
defense. The 1975 revision oftheManual for Courts-Martial attempted to solve sonic
of these problems. After the d-fense has presented expert psychiatric testimony at
trial, the Government may cumpel the defendant to submit to a government psy-
chiatric examination. The sanction for defense refusal to cooperate is the suppres-
sion or striking of the defense expert testimony. MCM, 1969, paras. 140a, 122b, 150b,
as amended, 49 Fed. Reg. 4247 (1975).
United States v. Johnson, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 424, 42 C.M.R. 402 (1973), exhibits one
possible solution to correct some of the noted difficulties. There the trial court issued
an order prohibiting any disclosure oftheresults ofapsychiatric interview of the ac-
cused outside medical channels and the defense. The judge made it clear that he
would personally review the findings and that no material would be disclosed to the
prosecution pending his final determination, see id. at 426, 47 C.M.R. at 404. The
Court of Military Appeals sustained this use of the court order although Judge
Duncan in his concurrencevoiced his strong doubts as to the legality of the protec-
tive order and the judge's power to issue it. Id. at 428-30, 47 C.M.R. at 406-08.
101 Even the use of a court order, see note 100 supra, does not address the essential dif-
ficulty. At trial the defense would usually present its evidence on the issue of sanity
by calling its expert witness. If the defense counsel attempts to ask its expert witness
for anything more than his ultimate conclusion on the defendant's sanity, he risks
"opening the door" to more probing questions by the trial counsel on cross-
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fails to give Article 31(b) warnings. If the psychiatrist chooses to
comply with that Article, he has negated Babbidge's premise
because the Article 31(b) warning specifically informs the suspect
or accused that he has the right to remain silent. Should a suspect
so warned knowingly waive his rights,10 2 then there is no Babbidge
issue. The armed services have combined to issue whatis known as
a technical manual'0 3 that specifically deals with psychiatric
issues in the criminal law area. Interestingly enough, a specific sec-
tion of that pamphlet addresses the topic of performing pretrial
psychiatric evaluations of a criminal accused 04 and specifically re-
quires a government psychiatrist to give Article 31(b) warnings.105
Query the effect of compliance with this particular paragraph? If a
suspect is so warned by a psychiatrist and says that he wishes to
exercise his right to remain silent, may a psychiatrist tell him that
the warnings were purely ritualistic and that he in fact has no
rights? Could the defense counsel in a case successfully argue that
regardless of Babbidge, the joint effort of the armed services of in-
cluding this language in its technical manual specifically modifies
the Babbidge case by creating a broader right for the accused? It
should be evident that the entire issue of the sanity of the accused
and the right against self-incrimination is an exceedingly difficult
one not susceptible of easy solution. Further clarification must
await the future litigation which is all too probable.
4. Undercover Agents
The other major problem in this area of Article 31(b) concerns un-
dercover agents and their responsibility, if any, to give Article 31(b)
warnings. While the mere suggestion that undercover agents
might be covered by Article 31(b) may appear somewhat amusing,
the language of Article 31(b) taken literally would require military
personnel acting in an undercover capacity to give Article 31(b)
examination (or indeed on direct examination of an expert witness selected by the
prosecution) which while revealing the basis of the ultimate conclusion also contain
the definite possibility of revealing incriminating statements given by the accused
during the conduct of the interview.
1112 There remains the argument that the suspect is so mentally ill that he could not
give an intelligent knowing waiver.
103 U.S. DEPrOF ARMY, TECHNICAL MANUAL No. 8-240, PSYCHIATRY IN MIUITARY LAw
(1968) [hereinafter cited as TM 8-240]. This manual was published as a joint services
manual under the auspices of the Departments of theAir Force and Navy, as well as
the Department of the Army.
104 Id. at ch. 4.
105 Id., para. 4-4f. Note that while the accused is to be told he can consult with
counsel, paragraph 4-4g states that "[n]ormally, there will be no third party
witnesses to the examination. Good rapport is best established when the psychiatric
examination is conducted with only the medical officer and the patient present."
19761
MILITARY LAW REVIEW
warnings prior to asking questions of suspects. Indeed, Judge
Ferguson's position in Seay10 6 would seem to support this. Unless a
literal meaning is ascribed to Article 31(b),10 7 however, this inter-
pretation appears hardly justifiable s0 8 The Miranda decision was
based in large part on the theory that the very presence in a police
station or involvement in a custodial interrogation could not help
but involve some form of psychological coercion. Article 31(b),
enacted for many of the same general reasons that underlie
Miranda,10 9 stems in part from a congressional desire for fairness
in interrogations. An undercover police setting, however, appears
to lack any of the traditional forms of police coercion.
The cases in this area accordingly support use of undercover in-
terrogation. 110 Unfortunately, the cases may support it to an un-
justifiable extent thereby raising questions of fairness and in-
fringement of a suspect's right to counsel. United States v.
French", is typical of one type of case involving undercover
agents. Captain French, an Air Force officer, sent a message to the
Soviet Embassy in Washington that he was willing to sell certain
classified weapons information to the Soviet Union in return for
cash to settle some gambling debts. The message was retrieved by
the FBI and some time later an FBI agent, accompanied by an Air
Force Office of Special Investigation agent knocked on Captain
French's door in New York. Upon entry they identified themselves
as Russian agents and engaged in a short conversation with Cap-
tain French. As soon as they had secured sufficient incriminatory
information to make it clear that Captain French was indeed offer-
106 United States v. Seay, 24 U.S.C.M.A. 7, 51 C.M.R. 57 (1975).
107 Interestingly enough, there are unconfirmed reports that a military judge sitting
at a general court-martial in Norfolk, Virginia, in the summer of 1975 accepted this
theory. Finding that an undercover Naval Investigative Service agent should have
given Article 31(b) warnings while attempting to make an undercover purchase of
narcotics, he suppressed the resulting evidence.
108 Chief Judge Quinn stated in United States v. Gibson:
Judicial discretion indicates a necessity for denying its application to a situation not considered by its
framers, and wholly unrelated to the reasons for its creation. . . Careful consideration of the history of
the requirement of warning, compels a conclusion that its purpose is to avoid impairment of the con
stitutional guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination.
3 U.S.C.M.A. 746, 752, 14 C.M.R. 164, 170 (1954).109 Compare Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,448-62 with United States v. Gibson, 3
U.S.C.M.A. 746, 752, 14 C.M.R. 164, 170 (1954).
110 See. (,.g., United States v. Hinkson, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 126,37 C.M.R. 390 (1967); Uni-
ted States v. Gibson, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 746, 14 C.M.R. 164 (1954); United States v.
Cartledge, NCM 742257 (NCMR 17 Sept. 1975) (unpublished opinion); United States
v. French, 25 C.M.R. 851 (AFBR 1958). The civilian position appears identical. See,
e.g., United States v. Gardner, 516 F.2d 334, 339-40 (7th Cir. 1975).




ing to sell classified data, they apprehended him and informed him
of his rights under Article 31(b). At trial and on appeal his defense
counsel's suggestion that the agents should haveread Article 31(b)
as soon as the door was opened was summarily dismissed."12
In United States v. Gibson 113 the Court of Military Appeals dealt
with another type of undercover agent case. There the court held
admissible certain admissions gathered from the accused, then in
pretrial confinement, by a fellow prisoner-termed "a good reliable
rat" who had agreed to act as a CIDinformant.The acknowledged
intent in Gibson was to obtain information from an individual
who would not otherwise have talked. The court found that Article
31(b) was not literal in meaning, that the "rat's" conduct was not
official action,1 14 and that deceit was lawful when not calculated to
result in untrue statements.115 In a similar vein, the Court of
Military Appeals allowed the introduction into evidence of ad-
missions made in United States v. Hinkson.16 In Hinkson, the ac-
cused was placed outside a Naval Investigation Service agent's of-
fice. A fellow Marine who had been acting as an informant was
placed in a seat next to him and initiated a conversation. Hinkson
made incriminating remarks. The court based its finding that the
admissions were properly placed before the court on the ground
that the accused must bear the risk of any discussion that he may
choose to have with others.1l17 It must be conceded that in both the
Gibson and Hinkson cases the possibility of the type of coercion
that motivated both Miranda and Article 31(b) was absent.
However, Article 31(b) arguably establishes whatmight be called a
rule of fairness,118 one that specifically prevents official in-
terrogations of suspects without supplying warnings. While review
of the congressional hearings leading to Article 31's enactment is
not of particular value, it does indicate that it was more than mere
coercion that troubled Congress.
112 25 C.M.R. at 865. During sentencing French testified that he had sold the plans to
settle gambling debts but that he was not morally guilty because he intended to cap-
ture the Russian agents via a suicide plan. The trial and appellate courts rejected his
explanation. 25 C.M.R. at 868. It could well be that his extenuation and mitigation
assisted the courts in rejecting his Article 31 claims.
113 U.S.C.M.A. 746, 14 C.M.R. 164 (1954).
114 Id. at 752, 14 C.M.R. at 170; cf. Hoffa v. United States. 38-5 U.S. 293 (1966).
11 United States v. Gibson, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 746, 753, 14 C.M.R. 164. 171 (1954).
"6 17 U.S.C.M.A. 126, 37 C.M.R. 390 (1967).
1 Id., 37 C.M.R. 390 (1967). The court's reasoning is similar to that of the Supreme
Court in Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
', The decision of the Court of Military Appeals in Souder v. United States. 11
U.S.C.M-A. 59, 28 C.M.R. 283 (1959), seems primarily to stem from a feeling that
fairness should predominate in military justice.
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If there is some substance to the concept of fairness which
motivated the court's decision in Souder, it may well be that the
concept is in harmony with a deeper congressional concern.
Although the coercion of rank that may have concerned Congress
is absent in cases such as Gibson and Hinkson, cases of that type
raise questions of fairness. It seems at least arguable that Congress
was attempting to partially redress the imbalance of skill and
resources between the individual and the military establishment
when it enacted Article 31(b). If this premise is accepted, it can be
suggested that there is a point in the process of bringing a man to
trial beyond which the Government cannot interrogate a suspect,
directly or indirectly, without notice.
The Supreme Court dealt with this very issue in 1964 when it
decided the case of Massiah v. United States.119 In Massiah, the ac-
cused was a merchant seaman who had been arrested for violation
of federal narcotics laws. Indicted, Massiah was released on bail.
He had already retained an attorney who had assisted him in his
arraignment and his plea of not guilty. Subsequent to the indict-
ment and unknown to Massiah, a co-accused turned government
informant and cooperated with the Government in placing a radio
transmitter under his car. Subsequently, the co-accused and
Massiah held a lengthy conversation while sitting in co-accused's
automobile. The entire conversation was monitored by government
agents, conduct which the Supreme Court found to be unaccept-
able. Quoting with approval from a New York case, 120 the Court
stated, "Any secret interrogation of the defendant, from and after
the finding of the indictment, without the protection afforded by
the presence of counsel, contravenes the basic dictates of fairness
in the conduct of criminal cases and the fundamental rights of per-
sons charged with crime."' 12' The Supreme Court went on to find
that the bugging of Massiah was a violation of the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel in that he had been interrogated after indict-
ment and in the absence of his already retained attorney.
While Massiah concerned an individual who already had an
attorney-unlike Gibson and Hinkson-it appears to stand for
basic proposition that an individual 22 who has been indicted may
not be interrogated by police or police agents without being in-
formed of his right to counsel. The reasoning of the Court in
Massiah would support the argument that in the military Article
1,9 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
120 People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 175 N.E.2d 445, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961).
121 377 U.S. at 205, quoting from People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561,565, 175 N.E.2d
445, 448.
122 Perhaps limited to an individual with counsel.
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31(b) warnings should be required even of alleged undercover
operatives at some particular point in the criminal justice
process. 123 A number of specific points could be identified where
this could be done: identification as a suspect; apprehension,
restriction, or pretrial confinement; the date that charges are for-
mally preferred; the date of formal referral; or the date of the trial
itself. While the term "indictment" has no formal equivalent in
military terminology, it is generally accepted to be the rough
equivalent of referral. 124 However, it seems more appropriate in
this area to consider indictment the equivalent of the point at
which the accused is either formally charged or his liberty is in-
fringed upon. At both those steps the accused is clearly placed well
within the criminal process and the system is on notice that he is
accused of the specific offense.
There is even some support in contemporary military law for this
particular view. The Court of Military Appeals condemned an in-
direct interrogation in the case of United States v. Borodzik.12
decided in 1971. In Borodzik, the accused was suspected of theft of
aviation watches. After two Naval agents visited the accused in his
civilian apartment and informed him of his rights, he exercised his
right to remain silent and requested an attorney. As he packed to
accompany the agents, they advised his wife that things would go
better for him if the watches were turned over to them. The wife
spoke to the accused out of the presence of the agents and her hus-
band then turned over eight aviation watches. The court held that
this was nothing more than an indirect interrogation of Borodzik
by the Naval agents1 26 and that the questioning was improper
without specific warnings. The opinion also implies that the agents
violated the defendant's already exercised rights to remain silent
and to have an attorney present. While in one sense Borodzik could
be held to have overruled Gibson and Hinkson sub silentio, such a
conclusion seems difficult to support. Indeed, in the Dohle decision,
Chief Judge Fletcher specifically referred to the Gibson case, in-
dicating that Dohle did not go so far (in his opinion) as to affect the
123 Jimmy Hoffa was held not to have a right to be arrested as soon as a prima facie
case was available. However, Hoffa is highly distinguishable from this argument;
Hoffa was not involved in the criminal law process until his arrest (other than being
identified as an accused or prospective defendant). Hoffa v. United States. 385 U.S.
293 (1966).
124 Indictment is of course the formal decision that sends a case to trial. Referral in
the military criminal process has the identical result. While the Article 32 investiga-
tion, see UCMJ, art. 32, 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1970). fulfills much the same investigatory
function as the grand jury, only the general court-martial convening authority has
the power that a grand jury has to send a case to trial.
12 21 U.S.C.M.A. 95, 44 C.M.R. 149 (1974).
126 Id. at 97, 44 C.M.R_ at 151.
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undercover agent problem. 1 27 Souder, Borodzik, and Massiah
together, however, would appear to make a strong argument that at
some step in the military criminal process prior to trial, the accused
can no longer be questioned by an undercover agent without rights
warnings being given. While this conclusion is far from radical, it
appears to lack specific supporting precedent at this time.
5. Civilian Police
The question arose in the early 1950's as to the responsibility of
civilian police to advise military suspects of their rights pursuant
to Article 31. The question had in fact arisen during the legislative
hearings concerning the then proposed Uniforn Code of Military
Justice. On Tuesday, March 24, 1949, during the hearings before
the House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, Sub-
committee Number 1, the following interchange took place:
Mr. Smart (Professional Staff Member): [Tihis particular article refers only
to persons subject to this code, so that if a military person is apprehended by
authorities other than military authorities they may likewise extract a
statement from the accused or suspect which is in violation of the
provisions of this article.
Now I think the record should clearly show that any statements obtained
under those circumstances would likewise be inadmissible.
Mr. Larkin. I think there ought to be a distinction pointed out there, Mr.
Chairman. In many State jurisdictions the local authorities have no obliga-
tion to inform a person suspected of an offense that any answers they [sic]
make may be used against them.
I don't think if a confession is obtained by the civilian authorities that it
should be inadmissible because the civilian authorities neglected to inform
the man in advance of his rights.
But you would face this situation if you required the civilians-whom you
can't require by this code-to inform a suspect in advance as provided in
subsection (b): A man may voluntarily walk into the local civilian
authorities or a police station and make a confession and they won't know
what it is all about and not having any obligation to inform him or not see-
ing any reason to, why you would then not be able under the construction
presented here to use such a statement or such a confession against the
man.128
The final rule in this area as expressed by the Court of Military
Appeals can be summarized as follows: Unless the scope and
character of cooperative efforts between civilian and military per-
sonnel demonstrate that the two investigations have merged into
an indivisible entity or the civilian investigator acts in furtherance
of a military investigation or in any sense as an instrument of the
127 24 U.S.C.M.A. 34, 36, 51 C.M.R. 84, 86 (1975).
12" Hearings, supra note 19, at 991-92.
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military, civilian police will not have to give Article 31(b) warn-
ings 129 although they remain bound by the Miranda rules. Thus
civilian police working on a civilian offense involving a military
service member will almost never have to give Article 31(b) warn-
ings. Only in those cases in which military and civilian police are
working in close cooperation with each other and arguably only in
cases in which the civilians are totally subordinated to military
control, will Article 31(b) apply to civilian law officers.
Representative of this view are United States v. Holder1 30 and
United States v. Temperly'3 l in which the Court of Military
Appeals in both 1959 and 1973 held that FBI agents engaged in the
arrest of military deserters were sufficiently independent from
military control (despite the purely military justification for the
arrests) to be immune from the requirement of giving Article 31(b)
warnings. The law is similar for cases involving foreign police;' 32
when acting independently of military authorities they are not re-
quired to give Article 31 warnings. 133 This general doctrine is based
in significant part on the rationale expressed in the 1949 con-
gressional hearings. If it is sufficiently difficult to have American
civilian police comply with the requirements of the Miranda deci-
sion, how much more difficult would it be for civilian police to
attempt to comply with military rules?
D. WHO MUST RECEIVE
ARTICLE 31(b) WARNINGS
Although not specifically stated in Article 31(b), the warning re-
quirements would appear to apply only to members of the armed
forces or perhaps those subject to military law. 134 There would seem
129See, e.g., United States v. Temperly, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 383, 47 C.i.R. 235 t 1973); U ni-
ted States v. Penn, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 194,39 C.M.R. 194(1969): United States v. Holder.
10 U.S.C.M-A. 448, 28 C.M.R. 14 (1959).
' ' 10 U.S.C.M.A. 448, 28 C.M.R. 14 (1959).
' ' 22 U.S.C.M.A. 383, 47 C.M.R. 235 (1973).
See, e.g., United States v. Swift, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 227. 38 C.M.R. 25 (1967); United
States v. Grisham, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 694, 16 C.M.R. 268 (1964). Should, however.
military authorities carry out an intertwined investigation with foreign police.
foreign police will have to give Article 31(b) warnings for any statements to be ad-
missible at an American court-martial. Cf. United States v. Schnell. 3 U.S.C.M.A.
464, 50 C.M.R. 483 (1975).
13 In 1975, the Court of Military Appeals decided the Schnell case, indicating its
willingness to require foreign police working with Americans to comply with
American fourth amendment standards. However, the court's track record in cases
involving the application of Article 31 to civilian police suggests the existence ofan
informal presumption that makes it unnecessary for civilian police to give Article 31
warnings. This situation may change with the "new" court
314 See UCMJ, art. 2, 10 U.S.C. § 802 (1970). For a general discussion of this problem.
see Horbaly & Mullin, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and its Effect on the Ad
ministration of Military Criminal Justice Overseas, 71 Mil.. L. RE-v. 1.20432 1976).
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to be little justification to extend Article 31(b)rights to civilians not
subject to the potential authority of the military criminal law
system.135 Certainly what little justification may exist-primarily
the argument that fairness and voluntariness require warnings-
would seem to be mooted so long as Miranda retains some vitality.
Clearly a custodial interrogation of a civilian by a military
policeman, somewhat rare in any event because of the Posse Com-
itatus Act,136 would require Miranda warnings. What standard
must be used, however, by the military policeman who apprehends
an individual in civilian clothes who may or may not be a civilian?
Research indicates only one military case that has even remotely
considered the issue.
In United States v. Zeigler, 37 a Marine warrant officer in-
terrogated a suspectin civilian clothes whom he,erroneously,believ-
ed to be a civilian "hippie" because of his clothes and disheveled
appearance. Although the Court of Military Appeals found that the
warrant officer's inquiry into the suspect's identity "was not, in our
opinion, the kind of interrogation into the commission of a criminal
offense which requires threshold advice as to the right against self-
incrimination and the right to counsel,' ' 38 both the majority and
dissenting 39 opinions seemed to recognize the inapplicability of
Article 31(b) to apparent civilians. An issue the case did not ad-
dress, however, is the standard to be used in reviewing the in-
terrogator's decision. Shall it be an objective one or simply a good
faith subjective belief by the military questioner? The question
remains unresolved.
While there has been little or no appellate litigation over the term
"accused" as used in Article 31(b), there has been a significant
amount of controversyover the word "suspect." 140 The issue, of
I "While there are numerous civilian employees in the Department ofl)efense whose
livelihood could be affected by any incriminating remarks and who could also be
subject to a form of rank inspired psychological coercion, the coercion present in the
uniformed forces comes from the possibility of direct punishment. Only those per-
sons directly liable to court-martial should be covered by Article 31(b).
''1 18 U.S.C. § 13,15 (1970). This act sharply limits the use of military personnel for
civilian law enforcement purposes. See, e.g., United States. v. Walden, 490 F.2d 372
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 983 (1974); United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp.
916 (D.S.D. 1975); United States v. Banks, 383 F. Supp. 368 (D.S.D. 1974); United
States v. Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Neb. 1974), appeal dismissed, 5 10 F.2d 808
(8th Cir. 1975).
1'- 20 U.S.C.M.A. 523,43 C.M.R. 363 (1971). See also United States v. Camacho. 500
F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1974) (identification required of possible civilian without Article
31(b) warnings although he claimed military status; Article 31 not discussed).
'18 20 U.S.C.M.A. at 526, 43 C.M.R. at 366.
1-19 Judge Ferguson dissented, apparently believing that the warrant officer believed
Zeigler to be a Marine rather than a civilian.
" See generally Maguire, supra note 45, at 15-18.
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course,relates not to the academic definition of the word, butrather
to the factual determination that must be made in each case to
determine whether a sufficient quantum of evidence existed at the
time of the interrogation for the individual questioned to have been
a suspect. It is clear that an individual may be questioned by a
policeman without being a suspect in either Article 31 or Miranda
terms. Even where a law enforcement officer is concerned about
possible criminal conduct, his "hunch" that a crime has been com-
mitted need not rise to the level of suspicion necessary to trigger Ar-
ticle 31(b).
In the illustrative case of United States v. Ballard,'" an air
policeman on night patrol saw tool boxes being placed in a private
car at the Base Equipment Management Office. The air policeman
investigated and asked Ballard his identity and place of duty.
Ballard replied with a bribe attempt. The Court of Military Appeals
held that the air policeman was simply performing his duty to in-
quire of anything out of the ordinary and did not at the time suspect
Ballard in the Article 31(b) sense. Similarly, in United States v.
Henry,142 the accused shot into a hooch in Vietnam killing a
soldier. Hearing the shot, an officer rushed to the scene and in-
quired of the small crowd in front of the hooch who had shot whom.
The accused confessed from the crowd. The Court of Military
Appeals held that Article 31(b) warnings were not required of the
officer prior to asking the crowd what had occurred.143 What is un-
clear, of course, is what level of suspicion is necessary beforeArticle
31(b) warnings are required and specifically, perhaps, how close
the finger of suspicion must point to a specific individual before he
or she becomes an Article 31(b) suspect.
The question of imputed knowledge has arisen occasionally.
Where one government agency is aware that the individual to be
questioned is a criminal suspect but the questioner-the actual
interrogator-is unaware of that fact, no Article 3 1(b) warnings are
required. 144 The difficulty with this imputed knowledge result is
that it seems to penalize good police work and good intra-
government communications and reward inefficiency. If one
government agent fails to inform another of the status of a case,
then Article 31(b) warnings are notrequired. Surely this conclusion
141 17 U.S.C.M-A. 96, 37 C.M.R. 360 (1967).
142 21 U.S.C.M.A. 98, 44 C.M.R. 152 (1971).
143 Accord, United States v. Shafer, 384 F. Supp. 486 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (involving in-
quiries made to National Guard personnel after shootings during a protest
demonstration at Kent State University).
144 See, e.g., United States v. Dickenson, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 438.20 C.M.R. 154 (1955); Uni-
ted States v. Brown. 48 C.M.R. 181 (ACMR 1973).
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is questionable. One can easily postulate a set of facts which would
present the defense with an excellent argument to estop the
Government from relying upon its own gross negligence to escape
the failure to give rights warnings.
E. WHEN MUST WARNINGS BE GIVEN?
The traditional phrasing is that Article 31(b) warnings must be
given whenever questioning or conversation designed to elicit a
response takes place.145 This formulation is, however, too
simplistic although it more than adequately makes it clear that Ar-
ticle 31(b) warnings need not be given in cases of spontaneous
remarks by a suspect. The military has followed the general
civilian rule that an individual who volunteers an incriminating
admission need not be stopped and given rights warnings.14
Whether an individual suspect who begins in spontaneous fashion
may be encouraged to finish his statement without being warned of
his rights is unclear. To the extent that authority may exist, it
appears likely that a witness to such a spontaneous admission is
allowed to add follow-up questions to complete a statement. 147
The difficulty with the "elicit a response" formulation is that it
does not adequately deal with the problem of preliminary or ad-
ministrative questions and "caught in the act" questioning. The
majority civilian rule in the Miranda area has been that questions
asked of the accused not intended to elicit incriminating ad-
missions but rather intended to elicit purely administrative
information-in short, preliminary questions-need not be
prefaced with Miranda rights warnings.148Theultimatel 49 position
of the military courts on the same issue is as yet unknown."'
The authors of Article 31 intentionally changed the language
from the phraseology found in Article of War 24 so as to eliminate
Article 24's absolute ban on any solicitation of any information
'45See, e.g., United States v. Borodzik, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 95, 44 C.M.R. 149 (1971).146 United States v. Vogel, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 160, 39 C.M.R. 160 (1968).
147 Id.
I 8 See, e.g., United States v. LaVallee, 521 F.2d 1109 (2d Cir. 1975); Owens V. United
States,__ F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1975). Numerous cases supporting this proposition are
cited in United States v. LaVallee, supra at 1109, n.l. Miranda could be interpreted
as applying only to station house interrogations. Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 247 (1973).
119 There is authority to believe that Article 31(b) may have been extended to any
questioning. See United States v. Hundley, 21 U.S.C.MA . 320,45 C.M.R. 94 (1972),
citing United States v. Williams, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 430, 9 C.M.R. 60 (1953); cf. United
States v. Pruitt, 48 C.M.R. 495 (AFCMR 1974). See also Maguire, supra note 45, at 31.
150 The cases in the area have not truly come to grips with the question. See United
States v. Vail, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 134, 28 C.M.R. 358 (1960), now almost a legal oddity
with its "caught in the act" exception.
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and to replace it with a ban on solicitation of incriminating infor-
mation.15 ' Despite this history, it seems likely that Article 31(b)'s
intent may have been to prohibit any official, unwarned question-
ing of a suspect whatsoever. 5 2 This suggestion cannot be taken
literally. A company commander who wishes to inquire of an in-
dividual suspected of or being investigated for an offense as to
whether or not he has finished an assigned military task certainly
will not have his question banned by Article 31(b). However, any
question posed to a suspect as part of an intended interrogation
into an alleged criminal offense may well be banned.
A related issue is the difficulty of "caught in the act" questioning.
This difficulty can arise when an individual surprises a suspect in
the midst of apparent criminal activity. In the civilian jurisdictions
the issue is a good deal simpler, for Miranda applies only to
custodial interrogations. Most questions asked by a police officer of
a suspectprior to an arrest will not be covered by Miranda or by any
other form of rights warnings. In the military, on the other hand, so
long as the military policeman is convinced that the individual is a
suspect, Article 31(b)'s literal language would require warnings.
The principal military case dealing with this issue is United States
v. Vail.15 3 Vail and two others were suspected of an attempt to steal
arms from an Air Force warehouse in Morocco. At the time of their
apprehension the Provost Marshal asked one of Vail's co-accuseds
to show him the location of the weapons which had been removed
from the warehouse. The weapons were produced in response to the
demand. The Court of Military Appeals chose not to decide the
issue of standing and decided that the production of the weapons
constituted a verbal act, an equivalent of an oral response. The
court stated: "The real question is whether an accused ap-
prehended in the very commission of a larceny must be advised of
his rights under Article 31 as a condition to the admission of
testimony of his reply to a demand to produce stolen weapons."15 4
The late Judge Quinn answered his own question in the following
fashion:
15' The revised draft of the UCMJ states that Article of War 24 made all improperly
obtained statements inadmissible against anyone. "rhis is changed." the draft con-
tinues, "Article of War 24 forbids the use of coercion to obtain any statement
whether or not self incriminating. Proposed article 43 [Article 31] forbids compul-
sion to obtai self-incriminating statements." 2 Morgan Papers, supra note 22.
revised draft of December 6, 1948, at page 3.
1-52 See note 149 supra.
153 11 U.S.C.M.A. 134, 28 C.M.R. 358 (1960).
154 Id. at 135, 28 C.M.R. at 359.
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Common sense tells us the arresting officer cannot be expected to stop
everything in order to inform the accused of his rights under Article 31. On
the contrary, in such a situation he is naturally and logically expected to
ask the criminal to turn over the property he has just stolen... In our opiz-
ion, Article 31 is inapplicable to the situation presented in this case.',
Judge Ferguson, on the other hand, in a well written and seemingly
correct dissent, argued that Vail was contrary to both earlier
decisions and congressional intent. Judge Latimer, concurring in
the court's holding, believed that Article 31 was not applicable at
all.
Although there is substantial civilian authority in the Miranda
area to suggest that Vail is a correctly decided case, the actual
validity of Vail as a military precedent is highly uncertain.
Research indicates that Vail has been followed only once, and that
in a general court-martial case affirmed in an unpublished
opinion156 by the Army Court of Military Review that found any Ar-
ticle 31 violation to be de minimis.15 7 In view of the legislative
history of Article 31 and its peculiar phrasing, it can be suggested
that Article 31(b) should apply specifically to the case of an in-
dividual caught in the act. In such a case the interrogator simply
must stop the individual, apprehend him should he choose, and in-
form him of his rights. This should not be as difficult or as an ab-
surd a suggestion as it might appear, for if the interrogator is not
convinced that the individual is responsible for criminal wrongdo-
ing, the individual is most likely not a "suspect" in theArticle 31(b)
sense and accordingly Article 31 warnings would not be required.
A never-ending Article 31(b) problem is determining if warnings
must be repeated when warnings have already been given to a
suspect at a prior interrogation. The general rule is that if the warn-
ings were given properly at the first interrogation session and that
the time elapsed between the first and subsequent sessions is suf-
ficiently short as to constitute one entire continuous interrogation,
separate warnings need not be given.158 On the other hand, if the
15  Id. at 136, 28 C.M.R. at 360.
156 United States v. Williams, CM 431074 (ACMR 22 July 1975) (unpublished opi-
nion).
15 7 Id. The court found that any prejudice was minimal in view of a full confession
made later after proper warnings. The decision of the Court of Military Review is at
odds with the automatic reversal rule usually applied in the Article 31 area.
151 See, e.g., United States v. Schultz, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 311, 41 C.M.R. 311 (1970)
(interrogations separated by seven hours found to be one continuous session): Uni-
ted States v. White, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 211,38 C.M.R. 9 (1967) (interrogations separated
by one day found to be continuous); United States v. Boster, 38 C.M.R. 681 (ABR
1968) (interrogations separated by 10 days found to be separate sessions).
[Vol. 72
MILITARY RIGHTS WARNINGS
time interval is long enough to create separate and distinct in-
terrogation sessions, then each individual session must be prefaced
by Article 31(b) warnings. 5 9 No firm guidance can be given as to
what minimum time interval between sessions will result in a deter-
mination that the sessions constituted a continuing interrogation.
The Court of Military Appeals and its subordinate courts have
decided each case on an individual basis. 160
Occasionally an individual taking part in an investigation as a
witness becomes a suspect.16' In such a case, it is the responsibility
of the individual questioning the witness to inform him of his
rights before proceeding further. 62 This rule does not, however,
apply to witnesses at trial 63 although there is strong support' 4 for
the proposition that the trial judge should himself interrupt the
witness and advise him of his rights. 65
IV. THE VERBAL ACTS DOCTRINE
One of the most perplexing questions surrounding Article 31(b)
concerns whathas been called the verbal acts doctrine. The express
phrasing of Article 31(b) is that "no person subject to this chapter
may interrogate, or request any statement from, an accused or a
person suspected of an offense without first informing him...." The
verbal acts doctrine originates in the definition of the word "state-
ment." There is no doubt that a testimonial verbal utterance is in-
cluded within the definition of "statement." However, the Court of
Military Appeals has indicated time and time again that the word
"statement" in Article 31(b) must be interpreted in a more expan-
sive manner. 66 It is because of the court's unusually wide defini-
159 See, e.g., United States v. Weston, 51 C.M.R. -(AFCMR 1976): United States v.
Boster, 38 C.M.R. 681 (ABR 1968).
160 See note 158 supra.
161 See, e.g., United States v. Doyle, 9 U.S.C.M A. 302, 26 C.M.R. 82 (1958).
162 Id.163 MCM, 1969, para. 140a(2); United States v. Howard, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 186, 17 C.M.R.
186 (1954).
164 See MCM, 1969, para. 150b; cf. United States v. Jom, 400 U.S. 470 (1971).
165 Note that such a warning may have the effect of deterring a witness from testify-
ing. A fascinating ethical question is raised if either the defense or trial counsel
(prosecutor) asks the judge to warn a witness of his rights (especially when the re-
quest is made in open court). Is such an inquiry ethical if it is made with an "im-
proper intent"? Attempts to protect a witness can backfire. See United States v.
Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971), in which the Court held that a mistrial declared to allow
proper warning of witnesses' rights against self-incrimination was without
manifest necessity and resulted in attachment of jeopardy to the defendant's first
mistried case.
166 The Court of Military Appeals has stated: "It seems to us that to say a
handwriting specimen does not constitute a 'statement' within the meaning ofArti-
cle 31 is to give that Article the most restricted interpretation possible." United
States v. Minnifield, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 373, 378, 26 C.M.R. 153, 158 (1958).
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tion of the word "statement" that the right against self-
incrimination in the military is to a large extent so very much
greater than in civilian jurisdictions covered only by the con-
stitutional right.
Clearly both the fifth amendment and Article 31 cover some
types of physical acts that must be considered equivalent to speech.
Surely no one would argue that an individual suspect would not be
covered by the requirements of Miranda if his interrogator told him
not to speak but to respond by nodding his head. For ease of
analysis, it is best to consider verbal acts in two general
classifications-acts not involving bodily fluids and acts involving
bodily fluids.
Verbal acts may be loosely defined as physical acts which
produce results similar to testimonial utterances-in short, verbal
acts are considered speech analogs. The acts usually discussed in
the cases involve identification cards, 167 surrender of a wallet '68 or
of stolen goods, or possession of contraband. 169 In the case of
United States v. Corson, 70 for example, a Navy Chief Petty Officer
suspecting Corson of possession of marihuana cigarettes told the
accused, "You know what I want, give them to me..."; the accused
replied by turning the contraband over to him. The Court of
Military Appeals held that the Chief Petty Officer's command was
the equivalent of a request for a verbal admission of possession and
that, accordingly, Article 31(b) warnings were necessary.
There are numerous military cases which have involved the ver-
bal acts 71 doctrine and any effort to attempt to bring them all into
line with any particular theory of the doctrine is doomed to failure.
Unfortunately, it appears that the various military appellate
courts are not, as it is occasionally said, "reading off the same sheet
of music." A theory can, however, be postulated for the nonbodily
fluid cases-a theory that appears to explain most of the cases. The
key to the synthesis is the concept that the surrender of an item un-
der circumstances indicating prior knowledge of its possession,
thereby fulfilling a key element of proof where possession is an ele-
ment of the offense, is the equivalent to a spoken admission. 72
167 United States v. Nowling, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 100, 25 C.M.R. 362 (1958).
168 United States v. Pyatt, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 84, 46 C.M.R. 84 (1972).
169 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, NCM 741757 (NCMR 3OJan. 1975) (unpublished
opinion).
170 18 U.S.C.M.A. 34, 39 C.M.R. 34 (1968).
171 See, e.g., notes 166-169 supra; United States v. Morris, 24 U.S.C.M.A. 176, 51
C.M.R. 395 (1976); United States v. Rehm, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 559, 42 C.M.R. 161 (1970);
United States v. Mann, 51 C.M.R. 20 (ACMR 1975).
172 It should also be enough if the information obtained is important to the case. In
Professor Maguire's formulation, unimportant information would not constitute a
"statement" in the Article 31(b) sense. Maguire, supra note 45, at 21.
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Thus, where a soldier is suspected of possession of heroin and is
ordered to take everything out of his pocket, Article 31(b) warnings
will not be required because farfetched as it may appear in practice,
the accused is entitled to react with surprise and denial should he
pull from his pocket the traditional glassene bag of white powder.
On the other hand, where, as in the Corson case, the suspect is
ordered to "take it out of your pocket, you know what I want," the
specificsurrender of the item in question in response to the demand
indicates knowledge by the suspect of exactly what is demanded.
Thus, Article 31(b) warnings would be required because the dis-
cretionary surrender of the object would be the equivalent of a ver-
bal admission of knowing possession.
Article 31, like the fifth amendment, interacts of course with the
fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable search and
seizure. In most cases a demand for an object will involve fourth
amendment as well as Article 31 issues. The oft-used "give me what
I want" demand raises both such issues. A search illegal under the
fourth amendment remains illegal even if the particular demand
would not run afoul of the verbal acts doctrine. It is also quite possi-
ble for a demand to be illegal in terms of both Article 31 and the
fourth amendment. The cases involving these issues run together,
and many cases which would develop a clearer theory of the verbal
acts doctrine if decided on Article 31 grounds are in fact decided on
the grounds of illegal search and seizure. The key element within
the area of verbal acts is discretion by the individual being in-
terrogated. These specific possibilities result:
(1) Where a lawful search is being conducted and the
suspect lacks any discretion, Article 31 does not apply.
(2) Where a search is unlawful and the accused is required
to perform a nondiscretionary act, the evidence will be in-
admissible on fourth amendment grounds and possibly on
Article 31 grounds as well.
(3) Where a lawful or unlawful search occurs and the
suspect is required to perform a discretionary act that is in-
criminating, the evidence will be excluded because of Arti-
cle 31.172
Under this analysis a lawful search overcomes the argument
that the mere act of surrender of contraband, for example, is in-
criminating. While such a surrender may well be incriminating in
172aThe Court of Military Appeals appears to have accepted this reasoning. St e Uni-
ted States v. Kinane, 24 U.S.C.M.A. 120. 1' ' n.1. 51 C.M.R. 310. 312 n.1 (1976).
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the literal sense of the word, the fourth amendment right to searcn
would predominate over any arguable application of Article 31 to
searches generally. Where, however, the individual's mind-and
consequently an act of discretion-is involved, the situation
changes and Article 31 and the right against self-incrimination
become dominant. Note, for example, the case of United States v.
Pyatt.173 Suspecting Pyatt of theft, the unit executive officer
ordered him to remove his wallet and count out his money. The
Court of Military Appeals held that the officer's order to count the
money, although it resulted in a physical act, violated Article 31. In
this particular case, probable cause for what was clearly a search
was lacking and it can be suggested that the order resulted in both
an illegal search under the fourth amendment and an Article 31
violation.
There are few verbal act cases of the "pure" possession type. Both
Corson and Pyatt are decisions of the Court of Military Appeals
and fit within the theoretical model suggested above. Other cases of
the same type are decisions of the subordinate military appellate
courts and, generally speaking, do not fit within the model. The
case of United States v. Davis1 74 is illustrative. Davis was a sailor
on liberty in Ismir, Turkey, who was suspected of possession of con-
traband. Like virtually all other members of the crew, he was
stopped for inspection before being allowed to board his ship. The
ship's captain, concerned that his crew might easily obtain drugs,
had ordered what amounted to a border search of all returning per-
sonnel. Davis was asked by the Master at Arms, "What do you
have? Come on, what have you got?" Davis replied, 'Please let me
throw it overboard." 175 The trial court suppressed Davis' oral reply
as a violation of Article 31(b), however, it did allow testimony that
Davis had surrendered a bag of marihuana. According to the
theory that has been suggested above, the evidence of Davis' know-
ing surrender of the bag in response to a demand for it should have
been suppressed as well. There is no evidence that the Navy Court
of Military Review which decided the unpublished case ever con-
sidered the element of possession as a critical feature. Rather, the
court reasoned that Davis, like all other sailors coming aboard,
would have been searched by order of the captain and that the
detection of the marihuana would have been inevitable. The court
therefore presumably felt that to distinguish between a simple
, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 84, 46 C.M.R. 84 (1972).
17, NCM 741757 (NCMR 30 Jan. 1975) (unpublished opinion). See also United States
v. Mann, 51 C.M.R. 20 (ACMR 1975).
175 NCM 741757 (NCMR 30 Jan. 1975) (unpublished opinion).
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search and the fact that Davis had personally surrendered the
marihuana was unnecessary. In Davis it is unlikely that a different
result would have followed even had the evidence shown that
Davis was found with marihuana.
The reason for the failure of the courts of review to follow what
seem to be the holdings of Corson and Pyatt is unclear. However,
both Davis and Mann are cases in which the ultimate result
appears to have been unavoidable. Perhaps the courts have been
applying some unarticulated harmless error rule. Whatever the
reason, there is little doubt that the theoretical structure expressed
above fails to comply with all of the relevant holdings. Only future
cases will demonstrate the ultimate viability of the theory.
Another line of cases involves suspects who are ordered to point
out their locker or certain belongings. In the usual case, a criminal
investigator demands that the accused point out the clothes he
wore the night before or point out his locker. The courts have con-
sistently taken the position that the act of pointing is the
equivalent of a verbal act. The Army 76 and the Air Force1 7 7 Courts
of Military Review have, however, held that where the act of point-
ing is merely what they have termed "preliminary assistance," Ar-
ticle 31(b) warnings are not required. What the cases really appear
to be saying is that when the question of knowing possession is
neither an element of the case nor of any particular significance,
any Article 31 issue is de minimis. In short, no one cares whether or
not the accused knew the locker involved, for example, was his.
These cases are to be distinguished from those in which the element
of knowing possession is critical; for example, the case in which the
suspect is asked to point out the clothes he wore the night of the
alleged robbery. Here identification of a jacket similar to that worn
by the robber is clearly a critical element of the case. In such an in-
stance the suspect is not merely being asked to give preliminary
assistance and Article 31(b) warnings must be given. Although ver-
bal acts are involved in all of these cases, it appears more relevant
to simply ask whether or not the specific "admission" being
litigated is truly material to the case. The precedents do appear to
suggest that Article 31(b) bars any statement taken in violation of
the Article s78 and this doctrine of preliminary assistance appears
1- United States v. Dickinson, 38 C.M.R. 463 (ABR 1968). See also United States v.
Taylor, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 178, 17 C.M.R. 178 (1954) in which a military policeman's re-
quest that Taylor point out his clothing was held improper in the absence of Article
31 warnings, because more than preliminary assistance was involved.
1
-
7 United States v. Neely, 47 C.M.R. 780 (AFCMR 1973). overruling United States v.
Guggenheim, 37 C.M.R. 936 (AFBR 1967).
18 See notes 147-149 supra.
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to be contrary to this rule. At best, one can suggest that this line of
cases creates a judicial exception akin to "inevitable discovery" in
order to avoid "unnecessary" suppression of evidence.
The key question in the verbal acts area is, of course, the
definition of "statement." As discussed, there is a line of cases in-
volving the physical act of surrendering an object. Much more dif-
ficult than the mere surrender of a physical objectis the question of
requesting an individual's identification. In 1958 the Court of
Military Appeals in United States v. Nowling179 held that an air
policeman who suspected an individual of being off base without a
pass should have informed the individual suspect of his rights un-
der Article 31(b) prior to requesting the individual's pass. The pass
which the defendant surrendered had another man's name on it
and was used to prove possession of an unauthorized pass. The
court held that the pass was the equivalent of a verbal statement
and covered by Article 31(b) because Nowling was a suspect. The
reaction to the Nowling case was vehement; indeed, it may have
been one of the primary reasons that the Powell Committee, 180 an
Army committee which analyzed the Uniform Code and
recommended 181 major Code changes in 1960, was appointed.182
While Nowling can be distinguished on the grounds that
physical surrender of the written pass was no different from sur-
render of marihuana or heroin, the basic question of identification
remains. Few procedures are as common to military life as the re-
quirement to identify oneself. Yet the identification requirement in
the case of a criminal suspect is a difficult question not yet resolved.
Whether the request is for a verbal statement or for an identifica-
tion card, the usual military police request clearly is a request for a
statement within the usual meaning of Article 31(b). However, the
effect of Article 31(b) is completely unclear. There is some sup-
179 9 U.S.C.M.A. 100, 25 C.M.R. 362 (1958).
180 See generally GENEROUS, supra note 20, at 13345 (1973).
181 The Committee's recommendations died stillborn, largely because of the refusal
of the Air Force and Navy to cooperate. Id.
182 The Committee's Article 31 recommendations can be found in COMMITTEEONTlE
UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE IN THE ARMY,
REPORT TO HONORABLE WILBER M. BRUCKER, SECRETARY OFTHE ARMY 87-89,101-103
(1960). In the area of verbal acts, the Committee recommended the addition of a sec-
tion (e) to Article 31 which N ould have read:
This Article extends only to oral and written statements and does not extend to -
(1) physical acts which do not require the active and conscious use of the mental facilities ofan accused.
or
(2) documents, tokens or papers furnished a person for identification or status determination purposes
and the acts necessary to display them upon demand.
Id. at 102-03. The Committee also recommended that the failure to give Article 31(b)
warnings should not result in the exclusion of the "statement" from evidence.
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port 8 3 for the conclusion that, as in the preliminary assistance
cases, because an individual's identity is not generally an element
of the offense, identification is not within the ambit of Article 31(b).
Despite this, the issue has not as yet been fully resolved by the
military courts.
The civilian courts are split with the majority rule being that
Miranda does not cover "noninvestigative questioning" including
a suspect's identity.1 84 The Ninth Circuit considered a similar ques-
tion in United States v. Camacho.185 Camacho, an ex-soldier, had
retained his identification card and was using it to illegally obtain
services at a Naval station which was not open to the general
public. The authorities, suspecting that Camacho was an ex-
serviceman in illegal possession of an identification card, ap-
proached Camacho and asked him to identify himself. He replied
by showing the identification card. The court of appeals held the
Navy was acting properly in checking the individual's identity if
only to ensure the base's security. The Ninth Circuit did not,
however, discuss Article 31 at all. What, then is the answer to the
identification quandry? As in the preliminary assistance cases, it
is suggested that Article 31(b) warnings must be given before re-
questing identity when the individual's identity is involved in the
offense. Thus in a desertion case where the suspect may be using an
alias, the military police should warn a suspect before asking him
his name. If, however, the suspect's identity is neither an element of
the offense nor reasonably believed to be significant, the issue
should be considered mere preliminary assistance not requiring Ar-
ticle 31(b) warnings.
The other major area in the verbal acts doctrine consists of the
bodily fluid cases. As indicated earlier in this article, the Court of
Military Appeals has consistently held that Article 31(b)'s right
against self-incrimination is more extensive than the fifth amend-
ment constitutionalright. 8 6 The primary means by which theCourt
of Military Appeals has extended Article 31 coverage is through its
1 See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 178,17 C.M.R. 178,181 1954) (dic-
tum); United States v. Jackson, 1 C.M.R. 764, 767 (AFBR 1951) and cases cited
therein. According to Jackson,".. . it is well established that an admission by an
accused of his identity. . . is not'an admission against interest'and consequently
evidence of such an admission may be received by a court'without proof of its volun-
tary nature'. " Query the validity of this conclusion. See also United States v.
Zeigler, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 523, 525-26, 43 C.M.R. 363, 365-66 (1971).
184 See note 148 supra. See also United States v. Menichino, 497 F.2d 935,939-42 (5th
Cir. 1974); United States v. LaMonica, 472 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1972); Proctor v. United
States, 404 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1968); ALI MODEL CODE OF PREARRAIGNMEr
PROCEDURE § 140.8(5) (1975).
185 506 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1974). See text accompanying note 137 supra.
186 See, e.g., note 166 supra.
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interpretation of the term "statement." The court has held, for in-
stance, that both handwriting 87 and voice exemplars'88 are the
equivalents of verbal admissions and are therefore covered by Arti-
cle 31(b). More difficult to rationalize, however, has been the bodily
fluid problem. The issue arose' 89 soon after the enactment of the
Uniform Code as to whether blood or urine samples could be ob-
tained from a service member without giving Article 31(b) warn-
ings.190 Prior to 1974, most military lawyers were under theimpres-
sion that Article 31(b) warnings where, in fact, required prior to tak-
ing such samples for criminal investigatory purposes. However,
the reason for the requirement of the warnings was totally unclear.
While a number of cases had been decided that held Article 31(b)
warnings to be required, 191 the cases predated the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California 92 and it
was generally believed that the Court of Military Appeals had
simply adopted a constitutional interpretation of the fifth amend-
ment contrary to that ultimately adopted by the Supreme Court. It
was, therefore, to the great amazement of many in the military
legal community that the Court of MilitaryAppeals extended the
scope of Article 31(b) in the case of United States v. Ruiz 93 in 1974.
Private Ruiz had been enrolled in a drug abuse program in Vietnam
which specifically forbade use of the results of urinalysis tests for
criminal prosecution purposes. 94 Indeed, the pertinent regulation
also forbade use of any results to discharge an individual with a
less than general discharge. 95 Ruiz was ordered to submit to a
urinalysis test to determine the success of his participation in the
program. He refused and was given a second order to submit. He
subsequently was court-martialed for disobedience of a lawful
order. On appeal, the Court of Military Appeals held that Ruiz was
properly within his rights to refuse the order because it was in viola-
187 Id.
188 See, e.g., United States v. Mewborn, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 431, 38 C.M.R. 229 (1968).
189 See, e.g., United States v. Williamson, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 320, 15 C.M.R. 320 (1954);
United States v. Rosato, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 143, 11 C.M.R. 143 (1953).
190 As already discussed, if bodily fluids are statements in the Article 31(b) sense, the
suspect has an automatic right to refuse to cooperate. Further, Article 31 would like.
ly bar involuntary sample acquisition despite United States v. Williamson, 4
U.S.C.M.A. 320, 15 C.M.R. 320 (1954).
191 United States v. Musguire, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 67,25 C.M.R. 329 (1958); United States v.
Jordan, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 352, 22 C.M.R. 242 (1957).
192 384 U.S. 757 (1967).
193 23 U.S.C.M.A. 181, 48 C.M.R. 797 (1974).
194 UNITED SATES ARMY, VIETNAM MANUAL No. 600-10, USARV DRUG ABUSE AND
REHABILITATION PROGRAM, at para. 3 (1971) cited in 23 U.S.C.M.A. at 183 n.2, 48




tion of Article 31 and consequently illegal. The rationale of the
Court in Ruiz is puzzling. As Ruiz could neither have been court-
martialed had the sample proven positive, nor been discharged
with a less than general discharge, 196 it is difficult to discover any
"incrimination" which would justify the assertion of Article 31.197
The likely basis of the court's holding is that it found that a general
discharge from the United States Army smacked of incrimination
because it may have much the same practical effect as a bad con-
duct discharge. 198 Indeed, the court did cite a number of Supreme
Court opinions1 99 involving discharge of public employees for
refusal to testify. However, itis difficult to extend those cases to the
Ruiz situation where there was no possibility of prosecution.
Prior to Ruiz, there had been some indication that Article 31
rather than the fifth amendment would itself be used to bar urine or
blood tests for criminal prosecution- purposes.200 The reasoning of
the Court of Military Appeals in those cases appeared to be that
whenever the individual was forced to create evidence that did not
existbeforehand, or to make use of his mind to create the equivalent
of a verbal intelligent utterance, Article 31(b) would be invoked.
This was generally summed up by what was known as the passive-
active test. If the evidence could be obtained from a passive suspect
who did not affirmatively cooperate in any fashion, Article 31(b)
19 6 A general discharge is one level "lower" than an honorable discharge. A recipient
of a general discharge is entitled to the same veterans' benefits as the recipient of an
honorable discharge. However, the public, particularly employers, may believe a
general discharge to be a stigma. See generally Jones. The Gravity of Ad-
ministrativeDischarges:A Legal and Empirical Evaluation, 59 M I .. L. REV. 1 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Jones].
197 Major Dennis Coupe of The Judge Advocate General's School has suggested an
interesting alternative theory. He suggests that underlying Ruiz is the court's deci-
sion to extend Article 31 to bodily fluids obtained for prosecutorial purposes. Assum.
ing this, Ruiz could have refused to supply the urine sample but for the regulation
which granted him immunity. The court could have decided that in view of this and
in the absence of formal notice of immunity from criminal prosecution, Ruiz was in
effect claiming a good faith belief in the right against self-incrimination. Thus, the
court may have been requiring the Government to inform Ruiz of his immunity (to
moot a possible affirmative defense in advance). While this interpretation is possi-
ble, the court's efforts to backstop its decision with fifth amendment decisions of the
Supreme Court makes this theory unlikely. Using either of these theories still leaves
one with the conclusion that the court believes bodily fluids to be "statements."
198 Jones, supra note 196. The Jones study confirms that a recipient of a general dis-
charge may be prejudiced in obtaining future employment, although to a lesser ex-
tent than one who has received a bad-conduct discharge. See also Lance. A Puniti'e
Discharge-An Effective Punishment?, THE ARMY LAWYER, July 1976. at 25.
199 Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Spevack v. Klein. 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
200 See note 191 supra.
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would not be involved. 201 On the other hand, if the individual's
cooperation was required to secure the evidence, the result was the
equivalent of a verbal statement and Article 31(b) warnings were to
be given. It is difficult to harmonize even this theory with the
process of obtaining a blood or urine sample. The bodily fluids are,
of course, already in existence. The subject's cooperation is
physical only and his mind and its contents are totally irrelevant to
the desired sample. Thus, the very justification that gave rise to the
right against self-incrimination in England would appear to allow,
as the Supreme Court itself determined in Schmerber, taking blood
or urine samples.
What then motivated the Court of Military Appeals to decide
Ruiz as it did? The court appears to have found that discharge from
the armed services with a less than honorable discharge is the
equivalent of incrimination. More importantly, it also seems to
have determined finally that supplying a bodily fluid sample is a
verbal act. Although to rule otherwise would have been to partially
overrule a number of prior cases, it seems likely that the Court of
Military Appeals could easily have determined that blood or urine
samples fell under the due process clause of the fifth amendment,
the fourth amendment, and paragraph 152 of the Manual for
Courts-Martial, rather than Article 31. In light of the fact that no
cases of major import had been decided since the Schmerber case,
this would not have damaged the court's adherence to the doctrine
of stare decisis. It must be concluded then that Ruiz was decided as
it was basically as a determination of public policy.
Due process and search and seizure both involve balancing tests
of one type or the other. Article 31 and the right against self-
incrimination, however, are generally absolute matters;20 2 either a
topic is covered within the ambit of the right and is therefore
protected or it is not. By placing bodily fluid sampling under the
right against self-incrimination, the court neatly guaranteed that
military personnel would not be compelled to submit to blood or
urine tests that could have any form of adverse consequence other
than the possiblity of being honorably discharged from the service.
The judges may have presumed that once they had eliminated the
major reason for requiring random urine analysis or blood testing,
the service member would be spared the necessity of submitting to
unnecessary and vexatious exams. It is questionable whether or
201 See, e.g., United States v. Williamson, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 320, 15 C.M.R. 320 (1954) (ex-
traction of urine via catheter from an unconscious suspect).
202 The only exceptions to this maybe in the preliminary assistance areas in which a
de minimis rule seems to be at work.
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not this conclusion, in fact, follows. 20 3 While the legislative history
is unclear, it seems highly unlikely that Congress truly intended
the right against self-incrimination in the military to be interpreted
in such an expansive manner. Despite the probability of this con-
clusion, the Court of Military Appeals has consistently interpreted
Article 31(b) in such a broad manner. One of the questions that
faces the new court will be not only the continued vitality of the
Ruiz case but, indeed, the continued widening definition of the
word "statement." Ruiz could, for example, logically be extended to
hold that an honorable discharge from the armed services under
other than voluntary circumstances is akin to a general discharge
and thus incrimination. Such a holding could significantly impair
military administration and morale. This particular means of
protecting a service member appears to be legally questionable,
and the long term position of the Court of Military Appeals on the
issue is an open question.
V. MIRANDA-TEMPIA WARNINGS
While Article 31 supplies the unique element in military rights
warnings, any survey of the law of warnings in the armed services
would be incomplete if it did not at least touch upon the military's
implementation of the Miranda decision .204 As Article 31 is broader
in scope than Miranda in all areas save that of the right to
counsel, 20 5 it is the right to counsel portion of Miranda which is
critical to military practice.
A. WHAT WARNINGS ARE REQUIRED?
The Miranda warnings may be phrased:
You have the right to remain silent;
Any statement that you do make may be used as evidence
against you at trial;
203 See, e.g., United States v. McFarland, 49 C.M.R. 834 (ACMR 1975) in which Judge
Alley affirmed the conviction of McFarland for refusing to give a urine sample.
Judge Alley distinguished Ruiz on the grounds that McFarland was suspected (and
enrolled in a drug control program) only of marihuana usage which could not be
detected by urinalysis. The judge found that the (in one sense) useless urinalysis had
a proper military purpose in that it tended to deter improper drug use.
204 See generally Hansen, Miranda and the Military Developnent of a Con.
stitutional Right, 42 MIL. L. REv. 55 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Hansen 1
205 Prior to United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629,37 C.M.R. 249 (1967), there
was no right to counsel in the military prior to preferral of charges and investiga-
tion. United States v. Gunnels, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 130,23 C.M.R. 354 (1975); United States
v. Moore, 4 U.S.C.M-A. 482, 16 C.M.R. 56 (1954): Hansen, supra note204, at 57-59.
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You have a right to consult with a lawyer and to have a
lawyer present during this interrogation and if you cannot
afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you free of
charge.206
There are other warnings given by police which have their origins
in Miranda but which are not expressly required. Notable among
these is the right to stop making a statement at any time.20 7 Prior to
1974, the right to counsel warnings of Miranda had been incor-
porated into military practice in a peculiarly military fashion. In-
corporated not only by the decision of the United States Court of
Military Appeals in United States v. Tempia,20 8 but also by
paragraph 140a(2) of the Manual for Courts-Martial, 20 9 the right to
counsel statement that military interrogators felt obliged to recite,
and indeed which is normally read to individuals today is:
You have a right to talk to a lawyer before and after
questioning or have a lawyer present with you during
questioning. This lawyer can be a civilian lawyer of your
own choice at your own expense or a military lawyer
detailed for you at no expense to you. Also, you may ask for
a military lawyer of your choice by name and he will be
detailed for you if his superiors determine he is reasonably
available.210
No specific authority exists anywhere for the part of the warning
that suggests that an individual may request specific military
counsel by name and that that individual will be supplied free of
charge if reasonably available. This aspect of the warning appears
to come from the standard rights to counsel given an individual
pending trial by court-martial 21' and even then that right is subject
to certain specific limitations.212 However, until 1974 there was no
doubt that the Manual for Courts-Martial had adopted the Tempia
206 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444.
207 Id. at 44445 (semble).
208 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967).
209 The Manual states:
An accused or suspect in custody has a right to have at the interrogation civilian counsel provided by
him (or, when entitled thereto, civilian counsel provided for him) or, if the interrogation is a United
States military interrogation, military counsel assigned to his case for the purpose
MCM, 1969, para. 140a(2).
210 U.S. Dep't of Army, GTA 16-9-2 (July 1972) (rights warning card).
211 See UCMJ, art. 38(b), 10 U.S.C. § 838(b) (1970).
212 See United States v. Jordan, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 164, 46 C.M.R. 164 (1973); United
States v. Johnson, 47 C.M.R. 885 (CGCMR 1973).
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decision in such a fashion as to supply all military personnel with
an absolute right to free military counsel regardless of their
economic situation. The Court of Military Appeals held that this
assumption was erroneous in the case of United States v. Clark.21 3
In Clark, the military interrogator had given a Miranda warning
which failed to meet the requirements of paragraph 140a(2).214 The
Court of Military Appeals, interpreting that paragraph of the
Manual for Courts-Martial, nullified its clear and plain meaning
and held that the writers of the Manual had intended to incorporate
only the decision in Miranda and not to extend the Miranda rights
to counsel in any way.215 The Clark case appears erroneous2 16 and
suspect. The court in Clark also failed to consider the difficulty of
applying a pure Miranda standard to military practice. Except for
the expanded legal assistance program, rights to legal assistance
in the military cut across all ranks and all economic classifications.
If the pure Miranda warning were to be given in the military,
someone would be compelled to determine whether or not the in-
dividual claiming indigency was in fact too poor to retain a civilian
attorney. Notoriously difficult within civilian practice, this would
be a good deal more difficult in the military unless arbitrary pay
grades were to be used. 217 Despite this, the Clark case remains a
valuable precedent for the prosecutor whose witness indicates that
he failed to comply fully with the military rights warnings. Due to
doubt of Clark's inherent validity, few prosecutors suggest that
routine counsel warnings should be truncated and replaced with a
pure Miranda warning.
There is some argument that the military has in effect created a
new right to counsel. The standard rights warnings given in
military practice 218 appear in one sense to be broader than any re-
quirement in either the Code or Manual, and broader than the re-
213 22 U.S.C.M.A. 570, 48 C.M.R. 77 (1974).
214 See note 209 supra.
215 22 U.S.C.M-A. at 570-71,48 C.M.R. at 77-78. But see United States v. McOmber. 24
U.S.C.M.A. 207, 51 C.M.R. 452 (1976).
2
"
6 See Judge Duncan's dissent in United States v. Clark, 22 U.S.C.M.A. at571-75, 48
C.M.R. at 78-82. Military reference sources ambiguously state that paragraph
140a(2) sets forth "rules [which] are a result of the decision in Miranda .... "which
is substantially different from saying that they are identical to the Miranda rules.
U.S. DEPT OF ARiY. PAMPHLET No. 27-2, ANALYSIS OF CONTENT. MANUAL FOR
COuRTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES 1969, REVISED EDrION 27-28 (1970).217 Procedural details to enforce this system can be imagined. The suspect could be
required to file a Pauper's Oath, which could be difficult to impeach in light of the in-
tent behind the Privacy Act, Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. 93-579,88 Stat. 1896. And
even if a suspect perjured himself in his Pauper's Oath, a court- martial for having
given a false official statement would appear to be an unnecessary sourceofuseless
litigation that is best ignored.
218 See text accompanying note 210 supra.
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quirements of Miranda in their failure to consider an individual's
financial resources. May the defense successfully argue that the
governmental adoption of rights warning cards and certificates-
forms that are required to be read whenever possible-have ex-
panded the right to counsel as expressed in the Manual for Courts-
Martial and created a new right? Clarification of this issue awaits a
case with the required factual circumstances.
B. WHO MUST WARN?
As indicated earlier 219 police officials or individuals performing
police duties in civilian jurisdictions are required to give Miranda
warnings. In the military, the same individuals who must give Ar-
ticle 31(b) warnings must give Miranda warnings if Miranda is
applicable to the situation, in other words, if a custodial interroga-
tion is taking place. There seems no reason to believe that any
difference exists between civilian and military practice as to who
must give Miranda warnings. 22 0
C. WHO MUST BE GIVEN
MIRANDA WARNINGS?
Both Miranda and its military analog, United States v. Tempia,
require that Miranda warnings be given to suspects undergoing
custodial interrogation. The difficulty in practice is determining if
a suspect is in fact in custody 221 when he is being questioned. A
number of different tests have been adopted by various jurisdic-
tions. These include focus, subjective intent of the police officer, the
subjective belief of the person being questioned, and the objective
test. Under the focus test, which has its origins in Escobedo v.
Illinois22 the question to be asked is whether the police have so
narrowed the investigation process so as to "focus" on a particular
suspect. In the now famous footnote 4 of the Miranda opinion2 23 the
Supreme Court attempted to indicate that the Miranda require-
ment that rights be given during custodial interrogations was what
it had meant earlier by the term "focus" in the Escobedo case. This
seems unlikely although possible.224
It is conceivable that focus remains a viable rule in cases where
219 See Section III.C. supra.
220 See MCM, 1969, para. 140a(2).
221 Custody is usually defined as any deprivation of freedom of action in any signifi-
cant way. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966).
222 374 U.S. 478 (1964).
223 384 U.S. at 444 n.4.
224 Clearly, Escobedo was in a custodial situation when interrogated. See Mr. Justice
Goldberg's opinion for the Court.
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custodial interrogation is lacking but focus exists.2 2 5 It is beyond
the scope of this article to discuss with any depth the various tests
that have in fact been enunciated by civilian courts to determine
the existence of custody. Within military practice, however, the
Court of Military Appeals has apparently adopted a modified obj ec-
tive belief test. Under this test, set forth in dictum in United States
v. Temperly,226 the primary issue is: was the suspect objectively in a
custodial situation? The court's language would seem to indicate
that this objective test is modified to some extent by the in-
dividual's own subjective experience. 227 It is theoretically possible
to have a case in which a suspect was objectively in custody but did
not himself think so. In such a case the individual being questioned
would not be subject to any form of psychological coercion for he
would not believe himself deprived of his liberty.228 While this test,
if it is indeed the military test, appears preferable to either the sub-
jective intent of the accused or the subjective intent of the police of-
ficer, both of which are particularly susceptible to the bias of the in-
dividual witness, the military test is not fully in accord with the
American Law Institute Model Code of Prearraignment Procedure,
which would have the rights attach before any questioning of a
suspect takes place at a police station. 229 However, the military rule
seems eminently satisfactory.
D. EFFECTS OF THE
WARNING REQUIREMENTS
The exclusionary rule is a basic part of military jurisprudence
having its origins both in the Miranda decision and in Article 31(d)
21' But see United States v. Gardner. 516 F.2d 334. 330-40 (7th Cir. 19751.
226 22 UJ.S.C.M.A. 383, 47 C.M.R. 235 (1973).
_,27 After seeming to rejectthe opportunity of deciding the issue on the basisof the ob-
jective intent of the interrogating officers because it would "go beyond one of the
reasons for the Miranda-Tempia requirements [which was to counter] the potential
for coercion inherent in custodial situations" the court distinguished an earlier
case, United States v. Phifer, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 508, 40 C.M.R. '_290 (1969), because
"[uinder either an objective or subjective test, a person [like Phifer] is subjected to a
more significant deprivation of freedom than a person [like Temperly]." United
States v. Temperly, 22 U.S.C.M.A. at 386, 47 C.M.R. at 238. The court concluded
that:
The purpose of.Mtranda-Tempta was to protect persons against abuive intt-rrogatiens Wherrtheac
cused is still free from police control, we see no interest that would beserved by extending to him a right
designed only to protect him against abuse of that control
Id. The court never clearly defined whether the determination of "freedom from
police control" should be determined objectively, or in the subjective view of the in-
dividual interrogated. See also United States v. Dohle, 24 U.S.C.M.A. 34.36-37, 51
C.M.R. 84, 86-87 (1975).
221 Arule of fairness might apply in part to prevent improper police conduct-one of
the traditional underpinnings of the exclusionary rule.
229 ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMEN'T PROCEDURE § 110.1(2) (1975).
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of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Failure to comply with the
Article 31(b) warning requirements 230 automatically triggers the
exclusionary rule found in Article 31(d) which forbids admission
into evidence at any crininal proceeding of any statements taken
in violation of the Article. Under military law, knowledge of one's
rights is insufficient to cure a defect in the warnings.231 This con-
clusion would appear to parallel the reasoning that the Supreme
Court followed in announcing the Miranda decision-if the at-
mosphere of a custodial interrogation may be considered as
presumptively coercive, even an individual fully aware of his rights
needs to be reminded of them. Of course, Article 31(d)'s prohibition
concerns only the warning requirements found in Article 31(b) and
not the Miranda requirements. However, Miranda's own ex-
clusionary rule and the Manual for Courts-Martial 232 combine to
extend the military exclusionary rule into the right to counsel area.
There are significant differences, however, between the military
and civilian exclusionary rules. The military, like civilian jurisdic-
tions throughout the nation, has both the primary exclusionary
rule and the fruit of the poisonous tree or derivative evidence rule as
well. However, the military rule is absolute while the developing
civilian law takes cognizance of a number of major exceptions.
Note, for example, that under the Supreme Court's recent
decisions 233 statements obtained in violation of Miranda v.
Arizona may be used for purposes of impeaching an accused who
testifies at trial. The Court of Military Appeals has rejected this
position, 234 basing its conclusion on Article 31, and has indicated
that statements taken in violation of Article 31 are inadmissible for
any purpose whatsoever. This does allow an accused who has given
a complete though improperly warned confession prior to trial to
take the stand and perjure himself without any possiblility of im-
peachment or perjury prosecution. Again, the court's reasoning is
presumably that Congress created a statutory right greater in
230 To overcome Article 31 and Miranda, an intelligent, affirmative and voluntary
waiver is needed. See, e.g., United States v. Long, 37 C.M.R. 696 (ABR 1967).
231 MCM, 1969, para. 140a(2). But see United States v. Hart, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 438, 42
C.M.R. 40(1970); United States v. Goldman, 18U.S.C.M.A. 389,40 C.MR. 101 (1969),
both of which should be regarded as nearly unique aberrations. See also United
States v. Stanley, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 384, 38 C.M.R. 182 (1968) holding that Miranda
bars circumstantial proof that a suspect knew his rights.
232 See MCM, 1969, para. 140a(2), 140a(6); see also United States v. McOmber, 24
U.S.C.M.A. 207, 51 C.M.R. 452 (1976).
233 Oregon v. Haas,_U.S._, (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
234 See, e.g., United States v. Girard, 23 U.S.C.MA. 263,40 C.M.R. 438(1975); United
States v. Jordan. 20 U.S.C.M.A. 614, 44 C.M.R. 44 (1971).
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scope than the constitutionally demanded minimum rights. 235 The
court has certainly indulged in this form of reasoning in a number
of areas.
The Supreme Court has, for example, recognized the possibility
of applying the harmless error rule to improperly admitted con-
fessions at trial, but the Court of Military Appeals has strongly in-
dicated that it will not apply the harmless error rule to cases in-
volving an Article 31 violation. 36 The court has stated that where
evidence complained of is in violation of the statutory provision
' The test to be applied and the remedy tendered may be more
beneficial to the accused than otherwise under standards enun-
ciated by the United States Supreme Court."2 37 Recently, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that where an accused refused police
efforts at interrogation, the law enforcement officers could properly
question the accused at a later time about an entirely new offense
not considered at the time of the first interrogation. '2
The position of the Court of Military Appeals is unclear in this
area. It seems likely that the court would recognize the police or
command right to ask an individual to reconsider his prior
decision.239 Such an attempt would be more likely to succeed where
the second attempt involves an offense completely unrelated to
the first. However, it does seem likely that thecourt would hold any
resulting evidence inadmissible if any form of coercion or strong
persuasion were used to obtain consent at the second or subsequent
interrogation. How many attempts to convince a suspect to change
his mind and make a statement will be allowed is unclear and the
Court of Military Appeals has indicated it will decide the issue on a
case by case basis.240
The problem of subsequent interrogations has plagued both the
civilian and the military courts alike. The general rule is, of course,
that no suspect or accused may be compelled to make a statement
against his will and that he must make a knowing, intelligent
waiver of his rights before a statement will be admissible at trial.241
Frequently military investigators determine that they have im-
properly complied with the warning requirements of Article 31 or
Miranda. They usually then endeavor to reinterrogate the accused,
235 See United States v. Hall, 23 U.S.C.MA. 549, 50 C.M.R. 720 (1975).
236 Id.
237 United States v. Ward, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 572,575 n. 3,50 C.M.R. 837,840 n.3 (1975).
' Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
See United States v. Collier, 24 U.S.C.M.A. 183. 51 C.M.R. 429 (1976) in which
Judge Cook (Judges Fletcher and Ferguson concurring in the result) attempted to
adopt an expanded view of Mosely.
240 See, e.g., United States v. Attebury, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 531. 40 C.M.R. 243 (1969).
241 See, e.g., MCM, 1969, para. 140a(2): Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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hoping to correct the error at the first interrogation. While the
Court of Military Appeals has indicated that it will look at each
case to determine whether or not the statement given at the second
or subsequent interrogation was in fact voluntary and will look to
factors such as elapsed time, the presence or absence of new rights
warnings, and the specific physical circumstances surrounding the
second or later interrogation, the court has also stated quite clearly
that
S.. only the strongest combination of these factors would be sufficient to
overcome the presumptive taint which attaches once the Government im-
properly has secured incriminating statements or other evidence.. .. In ad-
dition to rewarning the accused, the preferable course in seeking an ad-
ditional statement would include advice that prior illegal admissions or
other improperly obtained evidence which incriminated the accused cannot
be used against him.2 42
Thus, within military practice at least, not only must the warnings
be properly complied with, but a failure to comply with Article 31
and Miranda- Tempia creates a prosecution burden that is virtually
impossible to overcome.
VI. THE FUTURE OF THE
WARNING REQUIREMENTS
The Supreme Court seems to have embarked on a course of con-
sistently undercutting its decision in Miranda. Certainly recent
cases243 indicate quite strongly that Miranda's significance is in-
creasingly on the wane. While it seems probable that the Court will
never explicitly overrule Miranda, it seems likely that it will no
longer require that a failure to comply with the Miranda warning
requirements will in itself result in the exclusion of any resulting
evidence. If this is correct, theMiranda decision will continueto re-
tain some vitality; police will still be required in one sense to give
Miranda warnings. However, 'in the event that the police fail to
comply fully with Miranda, that failure will constitute simply one
factor amongst many in the determination of the voluntariness of
any resulting statement. In short, the Supreme Court is likely to
return to the pre-Miranda days when voluntariness in the common
law meaning of the term was the key issue for a trial judgeto deter-
mine prior to admitting confessions and admissions into
evidence. 244
2142 United States v. Seay, 24 U.S.C.M.A. 7, 10, 51 C.M.R. 57, 60 (1975).
243 See, e.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433
(1974); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). But see Doyle v. Ohio, 44 U.S.L.W.
4902 (U.S. June 17, 1976).
244 See generally Hansen, supra note 204.
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Such a decision would not necessarily change military law. That
Congress enacted the forerunner of Article 31 in 1948 is a fact not
easily ignored. It is improbable that the United States Congress
would at this late date attempt to nullify a statutory right of the ser-
vice member although there would be no constitutional inhibition
against doing so. Nullification of Article 31 would simply leave the
service member with his fifth amendment protections. Although it
wasunclearthat the constitutional right against self-incrimination
applied to the serviceman even in 1951, decisions of the United
States Court of Military Appeals make it apparent that the court's
view is that this right, among others, does apply today.2 45 Thus,
elimination of Article 31 would result in a distinct change246 in the
rights of a service member but not necessarily an unacceptable one.
It is impossible to appraise the effects that Article 31(b) rules may
have on criminal investigations generally.2 47 There is a definite,
although difficult to document, conviction among military lawyers
that the rights warnings in fact have no significant effect what-
soever on criminal investigations and that criminal suspects fre-
quently make statements regardless of the warnings. If this be the
case, it should not be particularly suprising. If, as Miranda
suggests, custodial situations are inherently coercive and engender
in a suspect an intense desire to cooperate with interrogators to
make things go easier for him, it can be suggested that regardless of
any rights warnings, the suspect continues to believe that things
will be worse for him if he does not cooperate. While one could
suggest that this feeling should be encouraged in order to increase
the number of admissions which could lead to independent
evidence of an offense,248 it may well be that this is additional
evidence to support the proposition that confessions and ad-
missions should be banned from criminal trials except under the
most unusual circumstances.
245 See, e.g., United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629.37 C.M.R. 249 (1967). Uni.
ted States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.MA. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960).
246 At a minimum the following changes would result:
Only suspects in custody would be warned;
Suspects would not be warned of the specific offense violated;
The scope of the right against self-incrimination would narrow sharply and
would no longer include blood and urine, voice, or handwriting exemplars.
247 A number of civilian studies evaluating Miranda suggest that the negative
effects of the decision have been minimal. See Note, Interrogations in New Hat'en:
The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1521 (1967); Note. A Postscript to the .firanda
Project: Interrogation of Draft Protestors, 77 YALE L.J. 300 (1967).248 The fear of unreliable confessions could be met by allowing use only ofderivative
evidence with independent validity.
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Any overview of the rights warnings situation in military law
would have to indicate that the system apparently works. Certain-
ly no hard evidence appears to exist to suggest that the Article 31(b)
requirements as augmented by Miranda cause any particular dif-
ficulties to military criminal investigators. Although confessions
and admissions are ruled inadmissible because of erroneous rights
warnings and "unnecessary" acquittals may result. However, the
general use of standard warning cards and waiver certificates dur-
ing military interrogations would support the perceived view that
most military confessions are voluntary and admissible.
While the current Supreme Court's apparent desire to undercut
Miranda seems at odds with the Miranda Court's assessment of
human nature, the congressional decision to require rights warn-
ings because of the inherent coercion involved in a military in-
terrogation appears valid. The Article 31(b) warnings are, in terms
of content, fair and include notice of the offense, a requirement not
found in Miranda; notice that the individual has the right to be
silent; and notice that if he chooses to speak there may well be
adverse consequences. The problems that exist with the utilization
of the rights warnings 249 within military practice do not appear to
go to the essential issue of whether or not there ought to be such
warnings, but rather address specific problems that could be
resolved. All in all, the Article 31(b) warnings appear to be a
workable solution to ensure the reliablility of military confessions
and admissions and to implement one of the fundamental rules of
Anglo-American jurisprudence. It would be particularly ironic if in
America's bicentennial year, the military, which ensured its
members greater procedural protections than the civilian com-
munity at large in 1948 and 1951, is left at the forefront of American
civil rights as the Supreme Court effectively nullifies, after one
decade, the general expansion of these rights to all citizens.
249 Virtually all of these problems could be resolved by educating police and public
alike to the reasons for Miranda and Article 31, and their employment. Simplifica-
tion of the warnings would also be useful.
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